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FOREST CARBON (REDD+), REPAIRING INTERNATIONAL
TRUST, AND RECIPROCAL CONTRACTUAL
SOVEREIGNTY
David Takacs*t
INTRODUCTION
Climate change, deforestation, and poverty present dire and intertwined
threats to human and nonhuman communities. In this paper, I examine how
the world's nations, businesses, and citizens are overcoming mistrust to
cooperatively address these threats.' I ask: How do negotiations to quantify
and control the world's forests highlight new frontiers for international law?
Through these struggles, how is sovereignty-a cornerstone of international
law-being reconstructed to adapt to twenty-first century perils that
demand unprecedented cooperation among nations? This paper addresses
these questions by focusing on the emerging regime of Measuring,
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verifying (MMRV) in global climate change
cooperation, with a particular focus on Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+).
During the last two centuries, we (especially we in the global North2)
have produced goods, generated energy, mechanized travel, intensified
agriculture, and destroyed forests, unleashing billions of tons of carbon into
the atmosphere. The overwhelming majority of climate scientists agree that
this pollution is changing the climate, and some portend an imminent

* David Takacs, Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. B.S., M.A., Ph.D. (Comell University); J.D. (University of California. Hastings College of the
Law); LL.M. (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London).
f I appreciate the contributions of Betsy Baker, William Boyd, Larry Carbone, Carmen
Gonzalez, Sarah Kakoff, Chimene Keitner, Spencer Potter, Jed Purdy, Dorit Reiss, Max Schuver, Erin
Sedloff, Evan Sznol, participants in the Vermont Environmental Law Scholarship Colloquium, UC
Hastings Junior Faculty Workshop, and Colorado/Duke Climate Change Works-in-Progress Summer
Institute, and the staff of the Vermont Law Review.
1. 1 would rank the threats posed by climate change just behind the threat of the use of nuclear
weapons.
2. I use "North" to refer to developed or industrialized nations. Northern nations have been
primarily responsible for creating the problems of global climate change through pollution associated
with industrialization; Northern nations are thus the only nations with binding greenhouse gas reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. "Southern" nations are those in the process of development.
Southern nations are least responsible for creating global climate change, yet will suffer the most from
its consequences.
3. 97.4% of climatologists who actively publish in the field agree that human activity is
changing the climate. Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change, Eos, Jan. 27, 2009, at 22; Fiona Harvey, Scientists Attribute Extreme
Weather to Man-Made Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN, (Jul. 10, 2012), httpI//www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2012/jul/10/extreme-weather-manmade-climate-change?INTCMP-SRCH; Scientific Consensus
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future of mass suffering and widespread death, or "a planet Earth
reconfigured as science fiction, since such high temperatures have not
existed for some tens of millions of years."A While the poorest of the poor
will suffer the most, climate change may disrupt all strata of human
**5
civilization.
on Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/ssi/climatechange/scientific-consensus-on.html (last revised March 4, 2011).
4. Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
45 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 703, 716 (2007). See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC], Chairman's Vision Paper, at 3, AR5-SCOP/Doc. 2 (July 13-17 2009), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/scopingmeeting ar5/documents/docO2.pdf (summarizing the lPCC AR4 assessments and
predictions); Anthony D. Barnosky et al., Approaching A State Shift in Earth's Biosphere, 486 NATURE
52, 52 (2012) (reviewing evidence of global ecosystem transitions); James Hansen, Makiko Sato, & Reto
Ruedy, Perceptionof Climate Change, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis.: EARLY ED., at 1
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/07/30/1205276109.full.pdf+htm (observing the
chance of unusually warm or cool seasons has become more and more likely in the past thirty years, as a
result of climate change); Christopher R. Schwalm, Christopher A. Williams, & Kevin Schaefer,
Hundred-Year Forecast: Drought, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
08/12/opinion/sunday/ extreme-weather-and-drought-are-here-to-stay.html?r-0 (examining evidence of
historical droughts); Justin Willis, Study Finds More of Earth is Hotter and Says Global Warming is at
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/08/07/science/earth/extreme-heat-iscovering-more-of-the-earth-a-study-says.html (noting that the percentage of the Earth's surface covered
in extreme heat during the summer has soared from 1%before 1980 to as much as 13% in recent years);
Tom Zeller Jr., A High Cost to Deal with Climate Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/business/energy-environment/31iht-green31.html?pagewanted=all
(reviewing global planning for climate change impacts); Joint Science Academies' Statement: Climate
Change Adaptation and the Transition to a Low Carbon Society, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES (June
2008), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/ climatechangestatement.pdf (expressing
the support of the National Science Academies of 13 nations, including those of the G-8).
5. See, e.g., KENNETH M. CHOMITZ ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, AT LOGGERHEADS?:
AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND TROPICAL FORESTS 1 (2007) (noting that the
environmental destruction from climate change in the tropics would affect people all over the Earth);
DARA, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR: A GUIDE TO THE COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET 19
(2d ed. 2012), available at http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CVM2-Low.pdf (forecasting
that over 98% of climate change mortality occurs in developing countries); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID
WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 11 (2010) (noting that poorer countries are located in warmer
parts of the world, and that warmer parts of the world are more likely to be affected by climate change
that cooler areas); RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2005) (noting that climate change will affect
developing countries more severely than developed countries because climate change will have a
heightened effect on tropical areas and on vulnerable economies); KEVIN WATKINS, U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE:
HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 8 (2007) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008], available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_ENComplete.pdf (describing
geographic vulnerability to climate change impacts); Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10
MELBOURNE J. INTL. L. 509, 513-14 (2009) (noting that climate change will "disproportionately and
unfairly" affect two groups-the world's poor and those living in island states); Carmen G. Gonzalez,
Environmental Justice and International Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77, 95 (Shawkat Alam et al. ed., 2013); Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension
to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy
Sector, 32 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 615, 623 (2004) (noting the challenge of globally implementing
sustainable development); Suzanne Goldenberg, GreenlandIce Sheet Melted at Unprecedented Rate
During July, THE GUARDIAN,
(July 24, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/

2013]

Forest Carbon

655

Yet in the redoubts of national capitals and local villages, corporate
boardrooms and private homes in both North and South, leaders and
citizens seem unable to overcome a "crisis of mistrust"6 and work together
to avoid this existential threat. Opportunities, however, present themselves
to break this impasse. REDD+, with an apposite system of MMRV,
comprises one piece of the legal puzzle to overcome this crisis of mistrust.
Through the process of negotiating a Kyoto Protocol successor,
Northern nations have pledged $30 billion in "fast track" mitigation aid to
Southern nations between 2010-2012. They have also pledged $100 billion
yearly by 2020 to support mitigation and adaptation activities in Southern
nations, which will be managed in a global "Green Fund" under the
auspices of the World Bank.7 REDD+ comprises a pivotal piece of this
puzzle and will attract a large proportion of these funds, as forestsespecially in the global South-are a commodity that diverse interests prize.
Beyond the formal multilateral negotiations, a host of other private and
governmental parties are pouring billions of dollars into REDD+. Funds
come not just under the legal aegis of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), but also from parallel, legally
mandated programs in Norway (spending $3 billion on REDD+8 ),
2012/jul/24/greenland-ice-sheet-thaw-nasa (describing the alarming rate at which the Greenland ice
sheet has melted, which can contribute significantly to sea-level rise throughout the world); Andrew C.
Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES (April 1, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/science/earth/Olclimate.html?pagewanted=all
(noting an IPCC
report, which found that wealthy, northern nations will not only experience fewer effects of global
warming, but also that they are better equipped to handle those effects); M.J. MACE, ADAPTATION
UNDER THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1 (2003),

available
at
http://www.field.org.uk/files/Adaptation-Tyndall%2OPaper-MACE-August%2023FINAL.pdf (presented at Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change Seminar, Zuckerman Institute for
Connective Environmental Research University of East Anglia, Sept. 7-9, 2003).
6. Murray Ward, To V or Not to V9: That is a Question, Oxford Energy and Environment
Comment, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, Sept. 2010, at 1.

7. Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate
Change Regime 11 (Mar. 7, 2011) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract id=1773865. Mitigation refers to actions to decrease the amount of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, either because we reduce the amount we emit, or we find natural or artificial
"sinks" that store the GHGs before they reach the atmosphere.
8. Leony, Aurora, REDD+ Biggest Success in Climate Change Talks, Norway Says, FOREST
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://blog.cifor.org/6264/redd-biggest-success-in-climate-change-talks-norwaysays/#.UU8TBRyk-bO. See also Christopher Joyce, Climate Strategists: To Cut Emissions, Focus on
Forests, NPR (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/10/143454111/climate-activists-to-cutemissions-focus-on-forests?ft-l&f-1025 (examining the potential of forests in climate strategies);
Daniel Kandy & David Diaz, Indonesia Bets on REDD With new Moratorium, but can it Deliver?,
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 19, 2011), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/
article.page.php?page id=8328&section-newsarticles&eod=1 (evaluating Norway's funding pledge
for REDD+); Norway Plans Record 2010 Carbon Capture Spending, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/13/us-norway-budget-carbon-idUSTRE59C1RC20091013
(detailing Norway's plans to raise more than $600 million to help fight climate change); Leony Aurora,
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California, and elsewhere. Funds also come from a voluntary market where
concerned citizens and businesses "offset" their greenhouse gas (GHG)
consumption through investing in REDD+.
The business of funding forests requires quantifying forests and their
benefits, and verifying the quantifications. MMRV has come to the fore as a
key to consensus. Without a comprehensive, rigorous, reciprocal-and in
many cases, intrusive-system of MMRV, global leaders likely will not
invest in the Green Fund or find common will for a multilateral
environmental agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol.9 Outside of the
formal, multilateral UNFCCC process, investors in REDD+ are developing
MMRV protocols to ensure multiple, synergistic returns on their
investments.10
By forging consensus on the scope and procedures of an MMRV
regime for REDD+, we could potentially mitigate the serious effects of
climate change, sustain tropical forests and the biodiversity and
evolutionary processes they perpetuate, and help poor people in the
developing world adapt to climate change while alleviating their poverty."
We might also reimagine some of our most cherished legal concepts to
render them more responsive to the needs of the twenty-firstst century.
Solving the MMRV puzzle helps build a system of international law robust
enough to tackle other pressing problems that don't respect national
boundaries, but that demand cooperation and trust between nations.
Debates over the reach of international environmental law in general,
climate change law in particular, and REDD+ most specifically, hinge on
arguments over the boundaries of sovereignty. Sovereignty, which is the
"most fundamental" principle of international law, poses obstacles to
World Bank: More Donors Supporting REDD+, CIFOR FORESTS BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://blog.cifor.org/6113/world-bank-more-donors-supporting-redd/#.T2eQkHhl-16
(discussing the
World Bank position on REDD+ donations); Press Release, Office of the Prime Minister of Norway,
Norway and Indonesia in Partnership to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation (May 26, 2010)
[hereinafter Norway Press Release], http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ smk/press-center/Pressreleases/2010/Norway-and-Indonesia-in-partnership-to-reduce-emissions-fromdeforestation.html?id-605709 (further describing the Norway-Indonesia REDD+ partnership).
9. JAKE SCHMIDT, NATRUAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TRACKING CARBON WITH TRANSPARENCY,

NRDC 1 (2010), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/trackingcarbon-fs.pdf.
10. See, e.g., THE CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY, &
BIODIVERSITY PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 4, 6 (2008), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/
CCBA/Upload/ccb_standards secondeditiondecember_2008+(1).pdf (noting that the Climate,
Community and Biodiversity standards can demonstrate a project's ability to provide returns for
investors and other stakeholders).
11. Conference of the Parties [CoP] to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [UNFCCC] Dec. 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at 14-15 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.17].
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climate change cooperation and to implementing REDD+.12 A efficient,
reciprocal, and equitable system of MMRV for REDD+ helps build a
framework for re-envisioning sovereignty for the twenty-first century by
recognizing the array of entities jockeying for a voice in controlling forests
and other dwindling resources, and through leading to greater cooperation
on all issues in an increasingly and necessarily interdependent world.
All legal institutions are social constructs, the product of countless
negotiations between entities with specific self-interests and varying
degrees of power. Global climate change imposes a more general interest.
The health and survival of current and future human and non-human
communities present a normative target towards which international law
should aim. I use the term "deep equity" to describe values, actions, and
laws promoting sustainable pathways that act in synergy to maximize the
health and potential of all individuals, communities, and ecosystems.13 The
equity is deep because it asks that values become rooted within each
individual, because it requires that we fundamentally re-imagine our
community structures and responsibilities, and entrench and encode these
values and responsibilities in our legal systems and policy choices. Our
laws and policies would, in turn, support values and actions promoting even
deeper equity. A world of deep equity presents a normative target for
reconstructing sovereignty.
I offer some assumptions. First, I take it as incontrovertible that global
climate change is real, anthropogenically caused, and heralds serious
consequences for how global ecosystems function-and thus how human
and nonhuman lives flourish. 14 Next, we won't solve or mitigate the global
climate change crisis without an unprecedented degree of cooperation
among nations and among non-state actors, as well. This cooperation must
be abetted by major innovations in international (and domestic)
environmental law to overcome the crisis of mistrust between actors and to
foment changes robust enough to ward off disaster. And we must reimagine
some of our most cherished notions of international law-for instance, the
sanctity and parameters of sovereignty-to adapt international law for the
global climate change era.
12. See UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.17, supra note 11, at 13(noting that international consultation
regarding climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC must be respectful of national sovereignty);
Duncan A. French, A Reappraisal of Sovereignty in the Light of Global Environmental Concerns, 21
LEGAL STUD. 376, 377 (2001); Joyce, supra note 8 (questioning the legal feasibility of carbon trading
between countries).
13. See David Takacs, Forest Carbon Offsets and InternationalLaw: A Deep Equity Legal
Analysis, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 521, 526 (2010) [hereinafter Takacs, A Deep Equity Analysis]
(describing the principle of deep equity).
14. See sources cited supra note 5.
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The emergence of a legal regime of MMRV for REDD+ shows how
we can potentially overcome a "crisis of mistrust" to promote cooperation
in mitigating climate change, deforestation, and other pressing problems.
Debates over MMRV reveal huge divides in power wielded by the North
and the South, while simultaneously diminishing that power differential and
dispersing power among disparate actors with fundamental stakes in the
world's forests. MMRV illustrates how disparate actors are posing
pragmatic new ways forward to construct international law, including the
cornerstone concept of "sovereignty."
In this paper, I explain how the goals and methods of REDD+ and the
system of MMRV can make infusions of cash for REDD+ feasible,
effective, and equitable. I cover the various proposals for a multifaceted,
reciprocal MMRV regime, and explain where the global community stands
as of late 2012, when this paper went to press. While detailing various
objections to the MMRV regime, I also show how implementing this
regime can help us incorporate more voices with legal rights and
responsibilities into international law, re-envision what international law
means by sovereignty, and help us move closer to the ideal of sovereign
equality. Responding to a cascade of ecological and political stressors,
MMRV for REDD+ proposes a process of negotiated cooperation that can
not only help ward off multiple ecological disasters, but may present a
model for how North and South may work together to address other
environmental problems that threaten us all.
REDD+
"REDD" stands for "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation." The "+" refers to not merely preserving intact forests and
reducing forest degradation (thus preventing new greenhouse gas
emissions), but to removing additional carbon from the atmosphere through
improving forest management, reforesting degraded land, and sequestering
extra greenhouse gases in agricultural land, peatlands, or wetlands."
Northern governments, businesses, and citizens are investing billions
of dollars in the vast, imperiled forests of the South. In a REDD+ project,
an entity-a national or regional government, a community, a private
developer, an individual landowner-reforests a degraded ecosystem or
15. The Copenhagen Accord, which emerged from the 2009 Conference of Parties to the
UNFCCC, defined REDD+ as: "reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the
need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emissions by forests." CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 2/CP.15,
Copenhagen Accord, 15th Sess., Dec. 7-19, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/l l/Add.1,
6 (Dec. 18,
2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord].
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preserves a forest that would otherwise be cut down or degraded. The entity
may then sell the carbon, now sequestered in the trees, for a contracted
period of time.16 REDD+ may happen on a project-by-project basis-one
developer, one landowner. Or REDD+ may happen on a broader scale, i.e. a
nation or state/province pledges to use REDD+ funding to reduce
deforestation or foment reforestation resulting in sequestered GHGs above a
"business as usual" (BAU) baseline."
Tropical deforestation accounts for about 15-20% of GHG emissions,
a greater contribution than all forms of transport combined, and equal to the
annual emissions of China or the United States.' 8 Trees absorb more than a
quarter of human emitted GHGs. 19 REDD+ helps mitigate global climate
change when it results in more carbon stored than would be emitted by the
polluting activities it enables. REDD+ projects may also help communities
adapt to climate change, which endangers survival of many species of flora
and fauna in forest ecosystems and may impair how those ecosystems
function. 2 0 Functioning forests furnish ecological resiliency for human
communities. Forests help human communities thrive by modulating local
weather fluctuations; preventing drought; buffering floods; filtering
drinking water; stabilizing soil; harboring pollinators; providing food,

16.

See DAVID TAKACS, FOREST CARBON: LAW + PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (2009), available at

http://www.conservation.org/Documents/CIClimateForest-Carbon Law-Property-RightsTakacs_
Nov09.pdf [hereinafter "TAKACS, FOREST CARBON"] (providing details of various property
arrangements for forest carbon).
17. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., OVERVIEW OF SUBNATIONAL PROGRAMS TO REDUCE
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) AS PART OF THE GOVERNORS'
CLIMATE AND FOREST TASK FORCE, 1-5 (2012), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/
documents/EPRI.pdf; JADE SAUNDERS ET AL., PROFOREST, REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION
AND FOREST DEGRADATION: LESSONS FROM A FOREST GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 6 (2008), available
at http://www.proforest.net/publication-objects/REDD%20and%20Govemance.pdf
18. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. Res. 2454, 11Ith Cong. §752(2) (2009)
(stating that deforestation is responsible for 20% of GHG emissions); HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT,
supra note 5, at 41 (stating that deforestation is responsible for 11-28% of GHG emissions); Valerie
Volcovici, A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/business/energy-environment/a-slow-start-for-the-for-carboncredit-market.html?pagewanted=all (noting that "deforestation.. emits as much carbon as all the world's
cars, ships, trucks and planes"); LORENZO COTULA & JAMES MAYERS, TENURE IN REDD: START-POINT
OR AFTERTHOUGHT?, at v (IED 2009), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/13554IlED.pdf (stating that
deforestation is responsible for 17% of GHG emissions); Gleb Raygorodetsky, Can REDD Ever Become
Green, OUR WORLD 2.0 (Aug. 1, 2012), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/can-redd-ever-become-green/
(explaining that "deforestation makes up 18 percent of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions").
19. Justin Gillis, With Deaths ofForests, a Loss ofKey Climate Protectors,N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/scienceearth/01forest.html? r--2&pagewanted=1&hp.
20. Charlotte Streck et al., Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 55 (Charlotte Streck et al.

eds., 2008).
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medicine, and building products; and preserving innumerable other
ecosystem services crucial for human survival.2 1
REDD+ investments may also abet socioeconomic climate change
adaptation through new sources of income (from carbon credits or
employment), new forestry-related skills (including participating in
designing and implementing MMRV systems), 22 ancillary project benefits
(e.g., project developers building schools or clinics), or clarified land title.23
21. I am not referring to preserving functioning ecosystems and their component species for
their own sake; desirable though that may be, it is not the focus of the legal climate regime. See VALERIE
CAPOS ET AL., U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION: A KEY
OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS, 9-10 (2007) (describing the human benefits gained

from healthy ecosystems); Stefano Pagiola et al., Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation
and Development, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR

CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds. 2002) (listing the many "benefits
provided by forests"); see also David Freestone, Foreword, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS:
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES ix, xii (Charlotte Streck et al. eds., 2008) (explaining

that jeopardized ecosystems are a danger to human well-being); THE CERSPA INITIATIVE, CERTIFIED
EMISSIONS REDUCTION SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2009), available at

http://www.cerspa.com (providing a template for a "simple, understandable, and balanced CDM
transaction agreement" and that identifies the "key legal issues" governing such a transaction).
22. See Margaret Skutsch, Ben Vickers, Yola Georgiadou, & Michael McCall, Alternative
Models for Carbon Payments to Communities Under REDD+ Using the Polis Model of Actor
Inducements, 14 ENVTL. SCI. POLICY 140, 141 (2011) (noting that forest-dependent peoples can
"contribute to the sustainable management of forests"); Richard Tipper, Helping Indigenous Farmers to
Participatein the InternationalMarketfor Carbon Services: The Case of Scolel Tj, in SELLING FOREST
ENVIRONMENTAL

SERVICES:

MARKET-BASED

MECHANISMS

FOR FOREST CONSERVATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT 232 (Stefano Pagiola et al., eds. 2002) (noting that farmers involved in REDD+ projects
have gained valuable technical skills in areas such as surveying, mapping, financial planning, and
silviculture); Promode Kant, REDD Should CreateJobs, Not Merely Bring Compensation 4, (Inst. Of
Green Econ., Working Paper No. IGREC-13, 2010), available at http://www.igrec.in/
REDDshould_create_Jobs_Not merelybringcompensation.pdf (arguing that an annual expenditure
of $1 million creates up to 1,000 full-time jobs in developing countries); REDD+ SES INITIATIVE,
REDD+ SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL STANARDS 8 (2010) [hereinafter REDD+ SES], http://www.reddstandards.org/files/pdf/langfenglishIREDDSocialEnvironmentalStandards_06_01_10_final-English.pdf
(introducing principles that incorporate indigenous peoples in the decision making and implementation
of an MMRV system); Workshop in Mexico Explores the Role of Local Communities in REDD+ MR V,
FOREST CARBON P'SHIP FACILITY, http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/339 (noting that
MMRV should support the overall REDD+ program and provide benefits to local communities) (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013) (archive copy on file with the Vermont Law Review).
23. See SISSEL WAAGE ET AL., THE KATOOMBA GRP., U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, & FOREST
TRENDS, PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED 10 (2008), available at

http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf (clarifying that regardless of
who the are suppose to benefit from international agreements, there is a ripple effect that can flow to
multiple beneficiaries); Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah, CDM Participationand Credit Pricing in Africa, in
EQUAL EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE FOR CARBON 127, 133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel,

eds., 2007) (noting the equitable concerns in the global carbon markets); Brian Walsh, Getting Creditfor
Saving Trees, TIME, July 23, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1642887,00.html (describing the World Bank's pilot program to preserve trees in exchange for
carbon credits); Carina Bracer et al., Organization and Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor
Compensationfor Environmental Services: CES Scoping Study Issue PaperNo. 4, at 35-36 (ICRAF
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REDD+ may assist with institutional adaptation as government officials,
community leaders, and individual landowners clarify land title and tenure,
develop skills and institutions to negotiate effectively with project
developers, or develop and manage their own REDD+ projects.24
Despite these potential benefits, skeptics claim that REDD+ does little
to mitigate global climate change and is instead an anti-democratic,
Northern self-interested, human rights-impairing scheme that exacts high
opportunity costs on poor nations and allows the already rich to profit at the
expense of the poor. Critics portray lose-lose situations, as Northern
consumers assuage guilty consciences over profligate lifestyles while
corporations mine profits from a system supposedly meant to save the
planet, but that actually sustains hydrocarbon-based capitalism as usual.
Naysayers allege that poorly planned REDD+ projects in the South are
methodologically suspect and bar poor people from traditional land.25
Working
Paper
No. 39,
2007),
http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/publications/
PDFs/wpl4961.pdf (noting that governments can promote conservation by respecting indigenous
peoples land rights); Julian Quan with Nat Dyer, Climate Change and Land Tenure: The Implicationsof
Climate Changefor Land Tenure and Land Policy 33 (Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Land Tenure
Working Paper 2, 2008) (showing that strong land rights may lead to greater stability); WILLIAM D.
SUNDERLIN ET AL., RIGHTS & RES. INITIATIVE, FROM EXCLUSION TO OWNERSHIP? CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN ADVANCING
FOREST TENURE REFORM
28-30 (2008), available at

http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_736.pdf (describing how strong land rights may
improve the income of beneficiaries); COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that carbon rights
are registered based on land title, and can help define who has management responsibility over the land).
24. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 623 (describing the importance of developing institutional
capacity in Africa in order to implement CDM projects); Ofosu-Ahenkorah, supra note 23, at 127
(noting that CDM can help developing countries attain financial benefits, reduce emissions, and achieve
sustainable development goals).
25. See WAGGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 11-12 (noting that a range of risks exist for those
selling carbon rights to forests, including loss of harvest rights, loss of employment, or unfair outcomes);
PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 119 (2003)
(parenthetical); DAVID HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM: DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE 208 (2006) (criticizing the international communities single focus on greenhouse gases
when implementing forest plans); Patrick McCully, How Carbon Credits Are Gutting the Kyoto
Protocol and Why They Must Be Scrapped, in INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, BAD DEAL FOR THE PLANET
(2008), available at http://www.intemationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/drp2english2008-521 0.pdf
(asserting that offset systems don't work and transfer wealth from taxpayers to consultants and
developers); Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change,
Privatisation, and Power, DEV. DIALOGUE,
Sept. 2006, at 230-33, available at
http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2006_48_carbon_trading/carbon-tradingweb.pdf (documenting how
international carbon programs have never delivered on their promises to local communities); Ann E.
Prouty, The Clean Development Mechanism and its Implicationsfor Climate Justice, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 513, 529 (2009) (describing how carbon offset programs may destroy the ability of
communities to self-govern); Kylie Wilson, Access to Justice for Victims of the InternationalCarbon
Offset Industry, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 1012-13 (2011) (listing the environmental and social risks
associated with forestry projects); Letter from Activist San Diego et al. to Gov. Jerry Brown and Mary
Nichols, Chairman, Cal. Air Res. Bd., Re: Climate Change Policy-Int'l Forest Offsets in California's
Cap & Trade Prog. (Jul. 10, 2012), available at http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/ca/b/
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REDD+'s critics are many, and I have been among them. I have
criticized how early REDD projects have been conducted, laid out a set of
deeply equitable principles for REDD+ that are unlikely to be achieved, and
described the daunting set of legal issues for delineating forest-carbon-asproperty.26 Yet I am also convinced that REDD+ may be our best chance to
institute law and policy reforms that could simultaneously safeguard the
planet's stunning biodiversity, reduce the planet's staggering levels of
human poverty, and reform the way developed and developing nations
incentivize sound ways of sustainable living for a sustainable planet. And
while it remains ethically questionable to use the South's forests as carbon
dumps for Northern industrial excess, these forests do remain an essential
source of carbon absorption for runaway human consumption that we have
not yet found the will to tame.
REDD+ has many diverse supporters. The South's forests are an
alluring resource for a coterie of otherwise strange bedfellows. Lush
tropical forests have seduced Northern and Southern government leaders,
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), pro-poor NGOs,
businesspeople, and international financial institutions (IFIs) that have
joined forces to promote REDD+. 27 REDD+ will greatly expand if
2271/LettertoGovernor andARBreCA_REDD final.pdf [hereinafter Activist San Diego Letter]
(arguing that REDD+ will not provide health or environmental benefits, protect forests, or displace
carbon emissions); ARIANA DENSHAM ET AL., GREENPEACE, CARBON SCAM: NOEL KAMPF CLIMATE
ACTION PROJECT AND THE PUSH FOR SUB-NATIONAL FOREST OFFSETS 3 (2009), available at

(arguing
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2010/l/carbon-scam-noel-kempff-clima.pdf
that the inherent problems in carbon offset schemes make REDD+ an ill advised program choice);
GREENPEACE,

THE

ECONOMICS

OF

0

2 C

AND

REDD

IN

CARBON

MARKETS

(2009),

http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/Globallintemational/planet-2/report/2009/4/the-economics-ofredd-summary.pdf (noting that the REDD program will slow the necessary move from dirty to clean
energy sources); TOM GRIFFITHS, SEEING 'REDD'? FORESTS, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE
14 (2009), available at
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS

http://www.rightsandresources.org/publication-details.php?publicationlD-923 (expressing concern that
the UN does not have criteria and standards for ensuring indigenous rights when implementing its
REDD Program); KEVIN SMITH, CARBON TRADE WATCH, THE CARBON NEUTRAL MYTH 26 (Oscar

Reyes ed., 2007), available at http://www.carbontradewatch.org/pubs/carbonneutralmyth.pdf
(pointing out that Northern countries have repeatedly tried to solve the worlds problems and in most
cases have failed or made things worse); REDD-MONITOR, http://www.redd-monitor.org/ (combining
recent news and updates related to REDD) (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
26. See David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate ChangeAdaptation,
and InternationalLaw, 15 W-NW J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 39, 85 (2009) (noting that the current system of
international environmental law does not provide a concrete means of combatting global climate change
and deforestation); Takacs, A Deep Equity Legal Analysis supra note 13, passim (noting that there is a
gap in forest carbon projects where neither domestic nor international law protects vulnerable people,
and where there is little liability for acts that violate human rights). See generally TAKACS, FOREST
CARBON LAW, supranote 16, at 5 (clarifying the legal regime for forest carbon-as-property).
27. See Peter J. Kanowski, Constance L. McDermott & Benjamin W. Cashore, Implementing
REDD+: Lessons From Analysis of Forest Governance, 14 EvNTL. SCI. & POLICY 111, 112 (2010)
(noting the flurry of activity surrounding REDD+ projects, as national REDD+ strategies are being

2013]

Forest Carbon

663

negotiators succeed in formulating a post-2012 successor to the Kyoto
Protocol as part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or similar
instrument that allows Northern nations to offset required emissions
reductions by investing in sustainable development projects in the South.28
California's Global Warming Solutions Act will allow a significant portion
of required emissions reductions to be offset, and officials are designing
regulations to incorporate international REDD+ as an acceptable
mechanism. 29 Regulators have already approved protocols, with
accompanying MMRV, for domestic forestry offsets.3 o The Governors'
Climate and Forests Task Force (GCF) joins nineteen states and provinces
in the U.S. (California and Illinois), Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, and
Nigeria to develop REDD+ rules and offsets. 3 Norway has pledged to

developed in more than 40 countries); James Kanter, In London's Financial World, Carbon Trading is
the Next Big Thing, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/
business/worldbusiness/06carbon.html (explaining that, within a decade, carbon markets could be
trading at a volume that is comparable to credit derivatives); Volcovici, supra note 18 (describing a
number of banks and IFIs that are working with environmental NGOs to develop REDD+ projects in
developing countries such as Brazil, China, and Indonesia).
28. See CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements, 16th Sess., Nov. 29Dec. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 1 76 (Dec. 11, 2010) [hereinafter "Cancun
Agreements"] (urging developed nations to support developing nations in developing and implementing
plans); Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 3; see also Peter Gelling, ForestLoss in Sumatra Becomes
a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06indo.html
(explaining that REDD would be a "central topic[] of discussion at the Bali conference"); Peter C.
Gelling & Andrew Revkin, Delegates in Bali for Talks on Climate Change,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/science/earth/02cnd-bali.html?pagewanted=print&_r=1&
(noting
the importance place upon conserving forests at the Bali conference); COTULA & MAYERS, supra note
18, at 2 (noting that REDD+ has become a centerpiece of post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and
that it will need to be part of an effective and equitable post-2012 agreement).
29. THE REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, CALIFORNIA, ACRE AND CHIAPAS: PARTNERING TO
REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM TROPICAL DEFORESTATION (DRAFT) 3 (2013), available at

http://stateredd.org/documents/2013/01/row-draft-recommendations-vl.pdf.
30. See CAL. AIR RES. BD. (CARB), CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN 64 (2008),

available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adoptedscoping_plan.pdf (describing
California's efforts to preserve its own forests to offset emissions); CAL. AIR RES. BD. (CARB),
COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. FOREST PROJECTS 60-75 (Oct. 20, 2011) (listing Californian
agencies tasked with establishing a monitoring program for carbon sequestered on forest lands);
Catriona Moss, California Working With Global Governors Group to Include REDD+ in Trade Scheme,
CIFOR FORESTS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011), http://blog.cifor.org/6224/california-working-with-globalgovemors-group-to-include-redd-in-trade-scheme/#.T8GM45A6FU (noting California's participation
in the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force); About GCF, GOVERNORS' CLIMATE & FORESTS
TASK FORCE, http://www.gcftaskforce.org/about (describing the aims of MOU signed by the Governors'
Climate and Forests Task Force, including "developing recommendations for policymakers and
regulatory authorities considering ways to integrate REDD+" into GHG compliance systems and other
pay-for-performance opportunities) (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
31. Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Partners with Other States to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Deforestation (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/pressrelease/I 1101/; About GCF, supra note 30; ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 17, at 1-8 to 1]1. See also About ROW, THE REDD OFFSET WORKING GRP., http://stateredd.org/about-row/
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become the North's first carbon neutral nation and is spending around $600
million/year on REDD+ to pay developing nations for measurable carbon
reductions, with major investments already in Brazil, Indonesia, Guyana,
and the Congo Basin, and $1 billion pledged to the first two nations alone.32
The World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Forest
Investment Program have mobilized over $1 billion to support REDD+.
The United States is spending $1 billion on REDD+ in developing
nations. 34 The voluntary market in forest offsets has become a multimilliondollar enterprise, as businesses and citizens voluntarily invest in REDD+ to
offset their consumption." Overall, over $5 billion dollars of funding have
been pledged or delivered for REDD+.
I.

AN UNPRECEDENTED REGIME OF MEASURING, MONITORING,
REPORTING, AND VERIFYING

A. MMR V Overview

For REDD+ to be done well, the robust system of reciprocal MMRV
will be essential. "You can't manage what you can't measure," proclaims

(describing the MOU signed in November 2010 between the Governor of California, Chiapas, and Acre)
(last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
32. See Aurora, supra note 8 (noting that Norway is committing $1 billion each to Indonesia
and Brazil to reduce deforestation); see also Joyce, supra note 8 (noting that Norway is spending about
$3 billion to support REDD+); Kandy & Diaz, supra note 8 (noting that the Norwegian government
made a $1 billion pledge to support REDD+ in Indonesia); REUTERS, supra note 8 (noting that Norway
plans to make itself "carbon neutral" by 2030 through offsets that will "soak up" GHG emissions
elsewhere).
33. See Aurora, supra note 8 (noting that World Bank's Forest Investment Program has
received pledges amounting to US $577 million and that the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility has
pledges

reaching

US

$436

million);

Introduction, THE FOREST CARBON

P'SHiP FACILITY,

http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/about-us (describing the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility's
Readiness Fund and Carbon Fund); see also Norway Press Release, supra note 8 (noting that Norway is
providing over $1 billion to Indonesia to reduce emissions from deforestation) (last visited Apr. 20,
2013).
34. TROPICAL FOREST GRP., FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR REDD+ IN GCF MEMBER

STATES/PROVINCES
3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/
TFG%20GCF%2OReport%20on%20REDD+_Funds_GCF_May/o207%20(English).pdf;
Kit Batten,
Climate Change in the Context of Development, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. [USAID] IMPACT BLOG
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/12/climate-change-in-the-context-of-development./.
35. MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & BLOOMBERG NEW
ENERGY FINANCE, BACK TO THE FUTURE: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2011 iv

(2011), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/-foresttr/publication-details.php?publicationlD-2829.
36. Overview, VOLUNTARY REDD+ DATABASE, http://www.reddplusdatabase.org (last visited
Apr. 20, 2013).
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the World Resources Institute. A prerequisite to a successful successor to
the Kyoto Protocol-and key to any significant investment in REDD+-is a
comprehensive system of measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying a
variety of parameters that help ensure all parties live up to their stated
commitments. An official United States submission to the UNFCCC says
that such MMRV provides the necessary "sunshine" to ensure all nations
are fulfilling their assumed pledges. 39 All parties want others to make clear
commitments and to be confident that everyone is making progress towards
fulfilling these commitments. 4 0 Northern donors and investors want to
guarantee a return on their investments, to ensure that Southern
governments and communities do what they say they will do, and to ensure
that aid reaches the intended communities. Southern governments and
communities want to ensure that Northern nations actually fulfill their
pledges to reduce GHG emissions, and deliver climate change mitigation
and adaptation funding that they pledge. Activists of many stripes want to
ensure that investments safeguard and promote economic welfare, human
rights, and biodiversity.
The acronym MRV first arose in preparations for the 2007 UNFCCC
Conference of Parties' (CoP) Bali Action Plan, which called for MRV as a
crucial element of any new international agreement. The Plan proposed that
developing nations, for the first time, would take "[m]easurable, reportable
and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or
actions.. . in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled
by technology, financing and capacity-building."a' Developed nations
would continue to take on "quantified emission limitation and reduction

37. Remi Moncel & Kelly Levin, Transparency and Accountability (MRV) in the Durban
Climate Deal, WRI INSIGHTS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/02/transparency-andaccountability-mrv-durban-climate-deal.
38. See CLARE BREIDENICH & DANIEL BODANSKY, MEASUREMENT, REPORTING AND
VERIFICATION
IN A POST-2012
CLIMATE AGREEMENT
29
(2009),
available at
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/mrv-report.pdf ("The ability of parties to reach agreement on new
commitments will depend in part on their confidence that those commitments can be reliably measured,
reported, and verified."); see also Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 5 ("Mitigation actions. . . will
be subject to ... domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported
through ... national communications every two years."); Cancun Agreements, supra note 28, 71(c)
(calling for the development of "robust and transparent national forest monitoring system[s]").
39. World Resources Institute, Summary of UNFCCC Submissions April 19, 2010-November
23,
2010,
at
10
(working
paper),
available at http://pdf.wri.org/workingjpapers/
unfcccsubmissions summary_2010-11-23.pdf
40. See SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that transparency and accountability are crucial to
assuring a successful international legal climate change regime).
41. CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, 13th Sess., Dec. 3-15, 2007, 1
1(b)(i)ii), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add. 1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
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objectives."4 2 This sets an international law stage for MMRV for Northern
and Southern emissions reduction commitments, as well as an MMRV
regime for financial and technical support from the North for Southern
mitigation activities.
A "crisis of mistrust" lead to the MMRV requirements proposed in the
Bali Action Plan and subsequent UN documents.43 Getting nations to agree
to any arrangement would prove difficult. As Murray Ward writes, "Let us
put diplomatic niceties aside and be honest. When the term 'verifiable' was
used in the Bali Action Plan. . .this had little to do with trust and
everything to do with lack thereof."44 Southern nations continued to insist
that Northern nations were and are primarily responsible for global climate
change, and thus they should bear the burden both of mitigating GHG
build-up and paying for Southern nations to adapt. Northern nations, lead
by the U.S., have been reluctant to accept any agreement that does not bind
the Southern nations (particularly the booming economies of China, India,
Brazil, and like nations) to share the burden of mandatory GHG
reductions. 45 Furthermore, they were not about to accept Southern pledges
without verification. According to Murray Ward, "based on a long history
of under-delivery, developed countries were not to be trusted to provide
adequate levels of support for such actions.
Currently, MMRV is simultaneously a weapon that various parties use
to bludgeon others, and a pragmatic set of tools to bring about conciliation.
Certainly the planet's two leading carbon polluters-the United States and
China-have not led the way to conciliation.47 In the run-up to the Cancun
CoP meetings, U.S. chief climate diplomat, Todd Stem, noted the raw
emotions and resentment engendered by climate change negotiations. He
nonetheless made it clear that the era of "differentiated" in "Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities" is over, and the era of "common" has
begun.4 8 In response, Su Wei, a Chinese climate negotiator, compared the

42. Id. 1(b)(i).
43. Ward, supranote 6, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM.
J. INT'L L. 230, 232 (2010); John M. Broder, At Climate Talks, a FamiliarStandoffEmerges Between
the US. and China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/science/earth/atclimate-talks-a-familiar-standoff-emerges-between-the-united-states-and-china.html?.
46. Ward, supra note 6, at 1.
47. See Bodansky, supra note 45, at 236 (noting that, at Copenhagen, the "principal bone of
contention between the United States and China" was the issue of measurement, reporting, and
verification ofdeveloping countries' emissions cuts).
48. See id. at 240 (distinguishing the Copenhagen Accord from the Kyoto Protocol, which
focused more on differentiated responsibilities).
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U.S. to Zhu Bajie, an ugly, vain, lazy, gluttonous, part-pig, part-human
character in Chinese literature.49
Although the two superpower negotiators largely behaved at the
UNFCCC Cancun and Durban conferences,50 the fundamental paradigms
that they represent remain incommensurable-although, as I will discuss
below, MMRV for REDD+ may bridge this gap. While MMRV stems from
this mistrust, it also presents a pathway to qualified, and perhaps genuine,
trust. The trick with an MMRV system for REDD+ is to build mutual trust,
achieve the multiple synergistic results that REDD+ promises, while
simultaneously respecting the legal and ethical underpinnings of Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities.
Currently, even if MMRV is key to making progress on battling
climate change and deforestation, the precise parameters-who has to meet
which MMRV obligations, on what subjects, with what intrusive
oversight-has proven somewhat intractable in negotiations to forge
multilateral climate change cooperation.5' According to David Hunter, at
Copenhagen:
[T]he entire negotiations pivoted on the extent to which
parties could reach consensus on the international MRV
requirements that would be applied to their various
commitments. This is not surprising given that the MRV
requirements in many ways are critical to whether an
agreement is or is not functionally binding.5 2
49. Bruce Ho, Of Pigs and Mirrors-TheBreakdown of the US-China Dialogue in Tianjin,
YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. LAW & POLIcY (Oct. 19, 2010), http://environment.yale.edu/envirocenter/post/
of-pigs-and-mirrors-the-breakdown-of-the-us-china-dialogue-in-tianjin/.
50. See, e.g., Elliot Diringer, Why Cancun Delivered, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, ELLIOT DIRINGER'S BLOG (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.c2es.org/blog/diringere/whycancun-delivered (observing the improved relationship between the U.S. and China at the U.N. climate
talks in Cancun); Robert Stavins, What Happened (and Why): An Assessment of the CancunAgreements
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=876 ("China and the United
States set the tone for many other countries by dealing with each other with civility, if not always with
understanding.").
51. David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accordfor Global Climate Governance, 10
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 4, 14 (2010); see also Bodansky, supra note 45, at 232, 236, 240 (noting
that, at Copenhagen, developed countries insisted on measurement, reporting, and international review,
while China rejected any international review); Anne Arquit Niederberger & Melinda Kimble, MRV
under the UN Climate Regime-Paper Tiger or Catalystfor Continual Improvement?, 1 GREENHOUSE
GAS MEASUREMENT & MGMT. 47, 47 (2011) ("Agreement on 'monitoring, reporting and verification'
(MRV) provisions for developing countries, as called for in the 2008 Bali Action Plan ... has proven to
be one of the most intractable issues in reaching a global climate deal.").
52. Hunter, supra note 51, at 14; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, Canctin Climate Change
Summit: America Plays Tough, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010, 8:55 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/nov/30/cancun-climate-change-summit-america
(noting
the
United
States'
intransigent insistence on developing country inspections).
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All systems of MMRV must thread the needle between cooperative or
punitive, carrot or stick. Furthermore, all nations are not created equal in
terms of historical responsibility for climate change and-this is not a
coincidence-in terms of their capacity to conduct MMRV. Yet at the same
time the methodologies of MMRV must be sufficiently uniform to allow for
comparisons and the ability of all parties to review the data. This is
particularly slippery when it comes to the delicate question of whether or
not developing nations will take on new GHG reduction commitments.
When discussing general compliance problems with international
regulation, Abram and Antonia Chayes write, "If we are correct that the
principal source of noncompliance is not willful disobedience but the lack
of capability or clarity or priority, then coercive enforcement is as
misguided as it is costly." 54 MMRV systems must be sufficiently rigorous
to be meaningful, but cost-efficient enough to be practical and to not pull
resources from other goals." Some observers urge that the eventual MMRV
mechanisms support, rather than burden, developing nations. Particularly if
we take Common but Differentiated Responsibilities seriously, this should
continue to be the case. Furthermore, delegates to the UNFCCC have
named no overarching philosophy for the purpose of the MMRV
framework that they are developing; are they attempting to verify
compliance, facilitate implementation, or something else?57
Nonetheless, as I discuss here, the parties are making some progress
towards a functional, clear, and enforceable system of MMRV.
Confusingly, in the literature, the "M" sometimes stands for
"Measurement" and sometimes for "Monitoring." 8 Both are essential: The
acronym should be "MMRV," and that is what I use here.59 Note that
53. Joe Romm, What Do You Think of the 'Cancun Agreements'?, THINKPROGRESS (Dec 11,
2010 2:28 PM), http://climateprogress.org/2010/12/1 I/what-do-you-think-of-the-cancun-agreements/
(summarizing the Cancun Agreements by Richard Caperton of the Center for American Progress).
54. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22 (1995).
55. See BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38 (noting that approaches to MMRV must be
practical, cost effective, and rigorous).
56. Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 48; Romm, supra note 53.
57. Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 48.
58. TANJA HAVEMANN ET AL., TERRESTRIAL CARBON GRP., POLICY BRIEF 5: MEASURING AND
MONITORING TERRESTRIAL CARBON AS PART OF "REDD+" MRV SYSTEMS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.terrestrialcarbon.org/TerrestrialCarbon Groupsoil %26 vegetationin climatesolution/
BackgroundReportsfiles/TCG%2Policy%/o2OBriefo205%2oMeasuring/o2oand%20Monitoring%/o200
91007.pdf.
59. The more common acronym is "MRV." The problem with that acronym is that sometimes
"M" is for "measuring," sometimes for "monitoring," and sometimes for both, even though they are not
the same thing. See, e.g., Romm, supra note 53 (referring to "'measurement, reporting, and
verification' as a means of ensuring that countries actually do what they say they will with respect to
REDD+ programs). Thus I use both M's.
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MMRV is proposed for a number of global climate change parameters: I
will focus on REDD+-related MMRV, but will mention other places where
parties seek to impose MMRV to ensure that other parties do what they
pledge.
You can measure anything quantifiable (and if it's not inherently
quantifiable, you can invent scales and gradients to make it so). For
REDD+, to measure forest carbon first means assessing the amount (or
stock) of carbon in a given area at a given time.o Measurement of forest
carbon stocks combines remote sensing and other geospatial surveillance
with field measurements that ground truth on a finer scale than what is
observed from space.6' Both remote surveillance and ground-truthing pose
challenges for a traditional concept of "sovereignty," a point to which we
will return later. Both mean that outsiders' eyes may pry into a nation's
internal doings.
Once baseline forest stock is measured, future forest carbon emissions
and sequestration can be predicted in the absence of REDD+ funding (the
Business as Usual, or BAU scenario). Thus funders can gauge whether
funded GHG reductions are genuinely additional to what would otherwise
occur.62 For example, an investor from a Northern nation should not be able
to receive GHG emissions reduction credits for a REDD+ project that
prevents deforestation that would not have occurred anyway; nor should
Southern nations necessarily receive cash payments for such projects.
Measuring baseline and changing forest stocks are also required to track
and prevent leakage, for example ensuring that when one section of forest is
preserved, the community or logging company or nation does not simply
cut down an equivalent amount of forest elsewhere.
60. HAVEMANN, supranote 58, at 3, 10.
61.

See, e.g., TERRESTRIAL CARBON GRP., POLICY BRIEF 6: ESTIMATING TERRESTRIAL

CARBON AT RISK OF EMISSION 4, 23 (2009), available at http://www.terrestrialcarbon.org/
Terrestrial_CarbonGroupsoil_%26_vegetation inclimate solution/PolicyBriefsfiles/TCG%2OPolicy
%20Brief%206%20100405.pdf (using biomass carbon maps from various sources, along with nationallevel data, to analyze potential future land use in developing countries).
62. HAVEMANN, supra note 58, at 3, 7. The CDM has adopted an "additionality tool" for
estimating future forest carbon emissions and sequestration. ADRIAN DEVENY, JANET NACKONEY &
NIGEL PURVIS, FOREST CARBON INDEX: THE GEOGRAPHY OF FORESTS IN CLIMATE SOLUTIONS 18

(2009), availableathttp://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-ForestCarbonIndex-web.pdf.
63. See Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through
Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 291 (2004) ("A carbon trading program must be carefully
designed and implemented to ensure that reductions are additional to those expected to result from
'business as usual' investments and that the reductions are permanent and verifiable."); Johannes
Ebeling, Risks and Criticisms of Forestry-BasedClimate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 43, 50-51

(Charlotte Streck et al. eds., 2008) (acknowledging the possibility of international leakage); Nelson,
supra note 5, at 635 (recognizing the need to "establish a baseline, the business-as-usual scenario that
serves as the basis for calculating emission avoidance or reduction"); Imke Sagemilller, Forest Sinks
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Techniques to measure forest carbon have become increasingly
sophisticated.64 But, as we shall see, various MMRV regimes also seek to
measure other indicators of performance, such as governance reforms,
development benefits, or human rights adherence. State of the art
technology will not help much with measurement here, but precision of the
goals or data one is trying to measure will.6 5
To monitor is to assess the changes in carbon or any other variable over
time. For REDD+, you can track changes in major land use classes and
track changes of vegetation density within those classes to monitor changes
in carbon sequestration over time.67 Again, this usually requires higher
resolution remote sensing and intensified on-the-ground monitoring for
ground truthing and fine-grained analysis. You can also monitor changes
in GHG emissions, financial flows, poverty reduction in local communities,
species richness, or any other variable once you have measured a baseline
and then tracked changes from that baseline.
To report is to go public with what you have measured and monitored
and thus permit others to see what you are doing and how you are doing it.
Successful reporting relies upon excellent measuring and monitoring, and
some standardization of format that allows viewers of reported information
to compare data; it also allows other parties to learn from what you are
doing.69 Reports may need to document not only forest inventories, but
project progress, methodological adherence or problems, financial
accounting, adherence to social and environmental standards, and legal
reforms or problems. Who must report (National governments? Subnational
governments? Businesses?) and what they must report may be contentious;
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol:
Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 195-96 (2006) ("[L]eakage occurs
when the project results in deforestation in another location in order to regain necessary space for
agricultural use."); Readiness Package Content and Assessment Approach: Concept Note - Draft for
Feedback 14, 17-18 (Forest Carbon P'ship Facility, FMT Note 2011-14, 2011), available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/FMT%/ 2ONote%2020
1 -14%20Readiness%20Package%20Concept.pdf (identifying leakage as a major risk associated with

REDD+ strategies); DEVENY, NACKONEY & PURVIS, supra note 62, at 55 ("The most significant risk
that could prevent the forest carbon markets from functioning effectively is the problem of leakage.").
64. See, e.g., What is a Methodology?, VERIFIED CARBON STANDARD, http://www.v-c-s.org/
methodologies/what-methodology (explaining the different methodologies of the Verified Carbon
Standard) (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
65. See BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 4-5 (noting that successful MMRV
regimes are a function of precise, reliable data, as well as transparency).
66. HAVEMANN, supra note 58, at 2.
67. Id
68. Id
69. See BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 5 (observing that successful reporting
requires precision, reliability, transparency, and standardization); SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 2 (calling
for greater transparency in reporting).
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for example, some Southern nations want MMRV for private Northern
companies' GHG emissions, which businesses consider sensitive
information.70 And to whom one must report may be similarly contentious:
A nation may be required to report its data to its own citizens, to national or
bilateral funders, to project developers, and/or to international institutions.
To verify is to ascertain independently that the information measured,
monitored, and reported is accurate.7' A nation, state, or community where
REDD+ projects are situated must have some process whereby an entity
with technical REDD+ expertise verifies individual projects as well as
overall compliance with national REDD+ plans, standardized MMRV
regimes (yes, MMRV for MMRV), social and environmental safeguards,
and the like. While it is clear that parties with legal commitments may
require formal verification to ascertain that they have done what they are
legally bound to do, the legal status of many of the commitments
contemplated for a Kyoto successor are more ambiguous.72 Verification and
compliance often overlap: in the former, someone evaluates information
accuracy, and in the latter someone offers a legal judgment of whether an
entity has met obligations it has assumed. 73 Some parties fear the antidemocratic effects of distant bureaucrats intervening in State or local land
decisions:7 4 Who verifies (International government bureaucrats? Other
states? NGOs? Expert commissions? Private accreditation firms?), how they
verify (Visiting sites? Inspecting record books? Remote sensing?), and
whether or not verification leads to legal judgments about formal compliance
are still to be determined in the REDD+ and broader climate regimes.
B. MMR V of What? The Complex Regime
What categories of action will require measuring, monitoring,
reporting, and verifying? As demands for MMRV spread, different voices
call for at least six different regimes of MMRV in the global climate change
70. See BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 5 ("[B]usiness actors are ofien the
ultimate target of international environmental standards . . . ."); see also FTC Comment Before the EPA
Concerning Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Confidentiality Determinations for Greenhouse Gas Data,
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0924, 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2009) (noting that certain categories of emissions
data that the EPA proposed making public could enable reporting companies to coordinate pricing).
71. Jorgen Wettestad, Monitoring and Verification, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 974, 975 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). But see Ward, supra note
6, at 1 (arguing that measuring and reporting may be sufficient and that it is generally unnecessary to
further verify).
72. Ward, supranote 6, at I (conceding that verification is necessary where legal commitments
exist).
73. Wettestad, supranote 71; BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supranote 38, at 7.
74. William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global
EnvironmentalLaw: Elements ofa Post-CopenhagenAssemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 457, 490 (2010).
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regime in general and for REDD+ assistance in particular. Comprehensive
MMRV is being implemented or proposed for:
*
*
*
*
*
*

Carbon sequestered in the forests of the global South;
Governance reforms, particularly with respect to forest
governance, in the global South;
Actual GHG reductions achieved in the global North and
South;
Northern financial and technological support for Southern
GHG reductions (particularly with respect to REDD+);
Biodiversity conservation in the global South; and
Social safeguards and economic development goals for
REDD+ in the global South.

Developed nations have pledged $30 billion for fast-track assistance
for mitigation activities in the developing world, and $100 billion annually
by 2020, with some portion of this for REDD+. Northern donors, led by the
U.S., are insisting on MMRV for all REDD+ (and other mitigation) actions.
They are asking for firm reduction commitments from Southern nations
(particularly the larger, BASIC nations-Brazil, South Africa, India, and
China-especially China) that are subject to MMRV review. Because
forests comprise the South's most bountiful carbon resource, that's where
much of the MMRV will focus. 75 In the discussion below, I will highlight
examples from national "Readiness Preparation Proposals" (R-PPs), as
nations line up to explain the MMRV plans that will allow them to access
funds from the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).
But Southern nations, too, are seeking greater transparency to ensure
that Northern nations actually deliver pledged GHG reductions and
financial and technical aid. Cross-cutting these divides, NGOs and other
activists seek MMRV protections for diverse ecological and social goals.
Formulating an MMRV regime that fulfills dizzyingly diverse interests
is the key to forging a successor to the Kyoto Protocol and to advancing any
mutually agreeable REDD+ program. That MMRV regime, in turn, is the
necessary prerequisite for major GHG emitters (in both developed and
75. See, e.g., Brian Walsh, At Cancdin, a New Pragmatismin Climate Policy, TIME, Dec. 13,
2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2036642,00.html
(noting that
deforestation is responsible for 12 to 17 percent of global GHG emissions each year). See generally
Broder, supra note 45 (discussing potential international climate change agreements).
76. R-PPSubmissions - Most Recent, FOREST CARBON P'SHIP FACILITY,
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org (listing most recent R-PP documents) (last visited Apr. 20,
2013). See also sources cited infra notes 105, 153.
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developing worlds) to pledge to reduce those emissions, to ensure that
billions of dollars of (sorely needed) aid flows from the North to the South,
and to protect healthy forest ecosystems in the global South.
C. Forest Cover Calculations
Remote sensing and other technologies have helped make tropical
forests a measurable object of climate governance. When technologies
allow remote observers to calculate the amount of carbon sequestered in an
area, this ensures that forest carbon can be fungible with more easily
calculated forms of industrial carbon pollution. That is to say, a ton of
carbon that a German coal-burning power plant emits is the accounting
equivalent of a ton of carbon stored in a Tanzanian tree that would
otherwise be chopped down, and we can monitor whether that carbon
remains stored.
To access the billions of dollars in REDD+ aid, nations, subnational
entities, or private landowners must either reforest degraded land or avoid
deforesting land that would otherwise be denuded. REDD+ funds hinge on
MMRV for deforestation and reforestation rates. For donor nations, this
means instituting a system of MMRV to ensure that reforestation and
deforestation efforts are successful-that the Southern nation or community
plants new trees or preserves existing trees where it says it has. Accurate
carbon emissions accounting requires MMRV for the rate of change of
forest cover and the density of carbon stored per hectare of forest.7 8
And so, for example, to ensure the reliability of compliance grade
carbon available as offsets for California's Assembly Bill (AB) 32, the
Global Warming Solutions Act, the REDD Offset Working Group
proposes:
[F]ield measurements and data provided by satellites, and
where the technology is available, sensors mounted on
airplanes. Satellites provide a convenient (and typically
cost-effective) means to monitor changes in forest cover
associated with deforestation, degradation and regrowth.
These changes in cover can be used in conjunction with
base maps of forest carbon densities, and the density of
77. See Boyd, supra note 74, at 525-26 & n.220 (noting that there are increasingly powerful
and technologically advanced methods of MMRV); William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental
Law: How DeforestationBecame an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 884 (2010)
(noting that remote sensing has offered policymakers "a previously unavailable synoptic view of tropical
deforestation").
78. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 17, at 2-7.
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carbon in the vegetation that replaces the forests, to
estimate emissions.
This means that every inch of a nation's territory would be surveyed from
space; patrols on the ground provide verification of satellite data, and add
fine-grained details of an area's forest. Carbon2Markets has developed an
online Carbon MRV toolbox that "provides an enterprise-wide solution of
on-line tools for planning and implementing national forest inventory for
carbon, development and management of carbon projects across all of your
organization's offices and units, and enterprise training and capacitybuilding."8 0 Google is offering Southern nations free hours of its "Google
Earth Engine," which can be used to track forest cover. But the tool can also
be used by anyone, whether or not the Southern nation wants to be
monitored.8 '
Carnegie Institution scientist Greg Asner has invented Airborne
Taxonomic Mapping System (AToMS) using LiDAR, a laser that can
produce a 3D picture of the forest canopy from an airplane.82 LiDAR
"employs two powerful lasers to blast through canopy vegetation, reach the
forest floor .... [and] map the forest at resolutions ranging from 10
centimeters to one meter, fine enough to 'see' understory shrubs and
epiphytes in tree crowns."8 In order for the system to work, the LiDAR
team must do intensive work in the actual forests to compile detailed
information on the forest's composition.84
Even with LiDAR, Google Earth or similar technologies, foot patrols
back up the accuracy of the remotely sensed data to make sure that the
broad changes observed from on high dovetail with what is actually
happening under the forest canopy. This combined spatial and on-the-

79. THE REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, supranote 29, at 42.
80. NEW! Carbon MR V Tool: An Enterprise On-Line Carbon Measurement, Reporting, and
Verification
(MR V)
Toolbox,
CARBON2MARKETs,
http://www.carbon2markets.org/
content.cfm?m=52&id=52&startRow-I&mm=0 (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
81. Rhead Enion, Google Earth Engine and Forest Offsets in Caifornia Cap-and-Trade,
LEGAL PLANET: THE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/
2010/12/07/google-earth-engine-and-forest-offsets-in-califomia-cap-and-trade/.
82. See Rhett Butler, Evolutionary Technology is Unlocking Secrets of the Forest, YALE ENV'T
360 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://e360.yale.edulfeature/camegie airborne-observatorytechnologyunlocks
secrets-of the rain forest/2447/ (noting that LiDAR uses two lasers that can read through the forest
canopy to map forests at resolutions ranging from ten centimeters to one meter); Joyce, supra note 8
(noting that LiDAR can provide metrics on how healthy and diverse a forest is).
83. Butler, supra note 82.
84. Id.
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ground scrutiny marks a noted incursion into a nation's sovereign
territory. 85
D.

GovernanceReforms

Northern nations are also promoting MMRV schemes for governance
reforms--essentially using MMRV as governance of governance. Various
organizations have established performance indicators for good
governance. 86 That is to say, "governance," too, can be quantified and
measured by entities seeking empirical assurance that their financial
investments reach their intended destinations and fulfill their intended
goals. The UN's REDD Programme, for example, is developing governance
"indicators" that would be fundamental prerequisites of REDD+ aid." The
World Resources Institute and other NGOs have put forth a "Governance of
Forests Toolkit," with indicators for forest tenure, land use planning, forest
management, and forest revenues and incentives, to help developing nations
reform the governance that drives deforestation and to help them efficiently
attract and spend REDD+ funds. 8 Intended, in part, for REDD+ Readiness
initiatives, Profor, "a multi-donor partnership"89 (all donors are Northern
nations), has developed a "tool" that provides indicator sets to measure
forest governance, including "the norms, processes, instruments, people,
85. Note that all the Readiness Preparation Proposals submitted to the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility include extensive plans for MMRV of national forests. FOREST CARBON P'SHIP
FACILITY, supra note 76.

86. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufinann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008, at 22 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp.,
Policy Research Working Paper 4978, June 2009) (describing trends in global averages of governance);
BRENDA BRITO ET AL., THE GOVERNANCE OF FORESTS INITIATIVE, THE GOVERNANCE OF FORESTS
TOOLKIT (VERSION 1): A DRAFT FRAMEWORK OF INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING GOVERNANCE OF THE

FOREST SECTOR (2009), available at http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/gfi tenureindicatorssep09.pdf
(outlining a performance indicator toolkit created by the Governance of Forests Initiative); NALIN
KISHOR & KENNETH ROSENBAUM, PROGRAM ON FORESTS, ASSESSING AND MONITORING FOREST
GOVERNANCE:
A
USER'S
GUIDE
TO
A
DIAGNOSTIC
TOOL
(2012),
available at

http://www.profor.info/profor/sites/profor.info/files/docs/AssessingMonitoringForestGovemanceguide.pdf (providing indicators that countries can use to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of forest
governance); Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/
wgi/index.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (reporting aggregate and individual governance indicators for
215 economies between 1996 and 2011 based on six governance metrics).
87. See Scope of Work - Towards a "Governance MRV Framework" 3-5 (UN-REDD
Programme, Draft 1, 2009) [hereinafter UN-REDD Program Draft 1], available at
http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc download&gid=310&Itemid=53
(noting that the UN-REDD Programme is "well positioned" to contribute to governance indicators for
MMRV frameworks).
88. BRITO ET AL., supra note 86, at 4-5; see also Worldwide Governance Indicators,supranote
86 (reporting on governance indicators).
89. PROFOR, http://www.profor.info/profor/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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and organizations that control how people interact with forests."90 The
authors advise that "[m]easurement serves reform; the parties who propel
reform forward-the government and key stakeholders-must be open to
change, or the results of measurement will not be put to full use." 9' The
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES 2009), which cleared the
U.S. House of Representatives but failed in the Senate, contained extensive
provisions for REDD+ offsets and REDD+ aid but required that recipient
nations possess the institutional capacity to reduce emissions from
deforestation, including strong forest governance and mechanisms to
equitably distribute deforestation resources for local actions.92
Those calling for MMRV for governance do not lack justification.9 3
Researchers believe that governance for forests-one of the main resources
Southern nations possess-is key to helping local communities ensure that
they can reduce poverty and safeguard their resources in the most
sustainable way.94 That is to say, REDD+ Governance MMRV is not just
about REDD+, not just about reforming what government elites can or must
do, and not just about forests-it can be key to reforming and re-imagining
how governments can be responsive to local concerns while preserving the
ecological resources that sustain local communities.
Furthermore, the reasons tropical forests are disappearing in the first
place include poor or inadequate governance structures.95 Northern donors
cite problems with Southern government corruption and seek some
assurances that a nation's elite will not arrogate REDD+ funds at the
expense of the poor and the forests upon which they depend.96 The UN90. KiSHOR & ROSENBAUM, supra note 86, at 3.

91. Id. at 4.
92. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. Res. 2454, 111th Cong. § 754.
93. See Michael N. Brown, Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 237 (2010) (reviewing places where corruption is likely to emerge in REDD+).
94. UN-REDD Program Draft 1, supra note 87, at 2 n.I.
95. See, e.g., CARMENZA ROBLEDO ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND GOVERNANCE IN THE

FOREST
SECTOR
5
(2008),
available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/
index.php?publD-857 (explaining how poor governance drives "[p]overty-driven deforestation").
96. For example, numerous REDD+ projects and much aid is proposed for Africa-a continent
that makes international investors wary. In the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, which reports data
from 180 nations, African nations filled 21 of the bottom 50 spots, and only three (Botswana 37';
Mauritius 42nd; Cape Verde 460) of the top 50 spots, scoring over 5 on a 1-10 scale. Of the 47 African
countries reviewed, 31 scored less than 3 (on a scale of 1- 10), meaning that corruption is perceived as
rampant, while 13 scored between 3 and 5, meaning that country experts and international
businesspeople perceive that corruption is a serious challenge. Corruption Perception Index 2009,
TRANSPARENCY
INT'L,
http://archive.transparency.org/policyresearch/surveysindices/cpi/2009/
cpi 2009 table (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). Part of becoming REDD+-ready may include overcoming
these perceptions to make African nations friendlier to all kinds of investment. The World Bank ranks
nations in terms of "Ease of Doing Business," measuring whether a nation's regulatory environment
facilitates or constrains doing business in the nation. Of 183 countries, only Mauritius (#19), South
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REDD program cites many "[g]overnance challenges," including
"unenforced land tenure systems, elite capture, marginalization of
stakeholders, uncoordinated mechanisms or corruption," among others, and
notes that cash infusions for REDD+ may either improve or exacerbate
problems in forest governance. 97 The Governance of Forests Toolkit cites
"low levels of transparency, accountability, and participation in decisionmaking and a lack of capacity and coordination in forest management and
administration. These manifest in high levels of corruption, pervasive
illegal and unplanned forest conversion and use, and conflicts over forest
ownership and access rights."98 Governments that lack clear legal structures
for forests-or that have trouble enforcing laws that are on the books-have
not been able to administer other forest regimes (e.g. logging concessions),
favor one set of entities over another (e.g. elite over poor), lack mechanisms
for participation from those communities most affected by forest
destruction or degradation, are corrupt or unstable, or whose various
bureaus work at cross purposes will have difficulty legislating,
administering, and enforcing programs that make use of REDD+ funds. 99
Critics allege that some early REDD+ projects exacerbated inequality
and resulted in a flow of funds from South to North, abetted by or hobbled
by poor governance in project nations.o00 What MMRV strings should be
attached to avoid this? One international meeting, sponsored by the UN
REDD Programme and Chatham House, listed as core governance
Africa (#39) and Botswana (#45) make the top 50 nations. 31 of the bottom 50 nations are in Africa. The
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic-which offer two of the world's
highest rankings of available land based carbon-are, within the bottom three on the list. Economy
Rankings, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2013).
97. UN-REDD Program Draft 1, supra note 87, at 3; see also Kanowski et al., supranote 27, at
113 (noting that the financial resources available to developing countries under REDD programs could
actually exacerbate factors that lead to forest loss and degradation).
98. BRITO ET AL., supra note 86, at 1-2.
FOREST

99. TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 22; see also LAWRENCE C. CHRISTY ET AL.,
LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 29-31 (2007) (noting that, in some areas of the world, the state may be the de
jure owner of a forest, but it is so weak that local or indigenous groups still claim rights to-or even
control of-the resource); Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1020 (2006) (noting that local
communities are "socially and economically dependent on the forest" and therefore may be unlikely to
transfer forest resources to outsiders, resulting in a "conflict between legal and norm-based systems");
Paul Mathieu, Legal Empowerment in Practiceto Secure the Land Rights oftthe Poor-A Short Concept
Note, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN

AFRICA 21, 23 (Lorenzo Cotula & Paul Mathieu eds., 2008) (listing trends and factors that threaten land
rights of poor peoples in Africa); Michael Phillips, Raising the Roof: In Africa, Mortgages Boost an
Emerging Middle Class, WALL ST. J., (July 17, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl18461080487067841.html (describing corruption in the Zambian land ministry as a former obstacle
to land transactions).
100. See sources cited supranote 26.
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parameters "[c]lear and coherent policy, legal, institutional and regulatory
frameworks," "[e]ffective implementation, enforcement and compliance"
(including effective and honest judicial system and anti-corruption
and accountable decision-making
measures), and "[t]ransparent
institutions" (including stakeholder participation parameters and conflict
resolution and grievance measures). 1 '
In their R-PPs to acquire World Bank FCPF funding, many nations are
opening up their governance systems to MMRV. Kenya, for example,
acknowledges that "[p]oor governance was identified as one of the major
drivers of deforestation and degradation and a number of candidate
strategies are proposed to address this .. .. Monitoring the impact of

governance measures requires assessment of the success in applying those
governance measures."1 02 Among the governance indicators to be included
in MMRV are "[d]evelopment of subsidiary legislations to support
implementation of the Forests Act 2005," "[h]armonization of sectoral
policy instrument to reduce conflicts," and "[s]trengthening community
participation and private sector engagement in management of forest
resources."l 03 The Lao Democratic People's Republic models its
comprehensive governance framework on the results of an international
workshop supported by the UK, the UN-REDD programme, and
international NGOs; it proposes a system of Governance MMRV for
variables such as "policy implementation, law enforcement, compliance
with environmental laws (e.g. hydropower, mining), illegal logging, land
use and carbon rights, equity of benefit-sharing arrangements, corruption,
institutional performance, [and] conflict resolution mechanisms."'04
Other nations seeking the thousands of dollars of REDD+ Readiness
are also agreeing to open up their international governance structures to
external MMRV. 05 These parameters traditionally fall within the purview
101. CHATHAM HOUSE & UN-REDD PROGRAMME, MONITORING GOVERNANCE SAFEGUARDS
IN REDD+: CHATHAM HOUSE & UN-REDD PROGRAMME WORKSHOP 4 (2010), available at
http://www.un-redd.org/Events/ChathamHouseWorkshop/tabid/4522/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
102. GOV'T OF KENYA, REVISED REDD READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 74 (2010),
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
at
available
Documents/PDF/Oct20l O/Revised%20RPP%20for/20Kenya.pdf.
103. Id.
104. LAO PDR, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 81-82 (2010) [hereinafter "LAOS R-PP"],
at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
available
Documents/PDF/Sep20l1/Lao%20R-PP%2OFinal%20draft%o20revised%2021%20DEC%202010CLEAN.pdf.
105. All proposals can be found at the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility website. See FOREST
CARBON P'SHIP FACILITY, supra note 76; see, e.g., GOV'T OF ARGENTINA, READINESS PREPARATION

PROPOSAL 7 (2010) [hereinafter ARGENTINA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartncrship.org/
fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jun2010/Argentina R-PP June 2010 0.pdf;
GOV'T OF CAMBODIA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 80, 91-94 (2011) [hereinafter CAMBODIA
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of national governments. So, for example, when the UN-REDD Programme
discusses its scope of MMRV work to address "unenforced land tenure
systems, elite capture, marginalization of stakeholders, uncoordinated
mechanisms or corruption," 106 it is reaching deep into the traditional
sovereign purview of nation states. To overcome sovereignty concerns
requires delicate negotiations to enable external monitors to collect data and
assess international governance structures, or to re-imagine what
sovereignty means-a point to which we'll return.
E. PledgedGHG Emissions Reductions
Both South and North want the other to actually reduce their emissions.
These reductions are at the heart of the efforts to mitigate climate change
and require MMRV.
Under the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, all nations have had to report on
their GHG emissions and emissions reductions, with developed nations
having somewhat rigorous and frequent reporting obligations, with
R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/Mar2011 /Cambodia/o20R-PP-Final/o20Clean/o2OVersion-%20March%205%2(/C%202011 .pdf,
GoV'T OF THE CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 104 (2011)
[hereinafter CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/
fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct20 11/CAR Revised formalR-PP
Englishtranslation-main%20textOctober72011 .pdf, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO,
READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 98-99 (2010) [hereinafter DRC R-PP], available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Mar
2010/RDCR-PPversion_2 March 2010 English.pdf; FED. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA,
READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 52 (2011) [hereinafter ETHIOPIA R-PP], available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jan2011
/R-PP Ethiopia-formal_submission-January 10_201 1.pdf; GUATEMALA, READINESS PREPARATION
PROPOSAL
143-46
(2012)
[hereinafter
GUATEMALA
R-PP],
available
at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Mar
2012/Guatemala%2OFinal%20RPP-March2nd%20version-ENGLISH-March%2014%2C%202012.pdf;
GoV'T OF MADAGASCAR, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 85 (2010) [hereinafter MADAGASCAR
R-PP],
available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/Nov2010 /adagascaz%20presentation%20at%20PC7%20-%20Washington%20DC.pdf;
Gov'T OF PERU, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL (2011) [hereinafter PERU R-PP], available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestabopartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/ar20l 1/P
erud2R-PP-%20Final%2EnglishN2Translation-March7%20version-Marchl6%2C%202011.pdf; UNITED
REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 58 (2010) [hereinafter TANZANIA R-PP],
available
at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/Oct2010/REVISEDFINALTanzania.R-PP main documentVl2 7.10.2010%5Bl%5D.pdf
Gov'T OF UGANDA, REDD READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL FOR UGANDA 134, 143 (2011)
[hereinafter
UGANDA
R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestarbonpartnehip.org/files/Documents/PDF/May2012/Uganda%20R-PP%20Submitted%20%28Revised%
20in%20Compliance%2Owith/o2OResolution%20PC 9 2011 3%20/o29o/o2lncluding/o2oParticipation%2Oand
%20Consultation%20Plan%20/28M.pdf. I did not review R-PPs written in languages other than English.
106. UN-REDD Program Draft 1, supra note 87, at 3.
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verification from expert teams.10 7 Annex 1 nations (those developed nations
that take on formal GHG reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol)
must report the quantity of their reductions, as well as the actual means they
have used to achieve those reductions.os An electronic system tracks these
national registries, with oversight from the UNFCCC secretariat. 09 While
some observers note that this system works well,"o some critics advocate
more frequent, more transparent, more reviewable, and more detailed
MMRV."' However, this system did not become operational until 2008,
eleven years after the Kyoto Protocol was formalized (and three years after
it went into effect), and formal review did not happen until 2009; thus it is
difficult to assess how well this system works.1 2 Annex 1 parties also need
to describe how they are meeting their GHG reduction goals, although no
standardized methodology allows comparisons across nations, and outsiders
have few opportunities to assess the accuracy of these data." 3
Non-Annex 1 developing nations have no mandatory GHG reduction
commitments and often lack resources to conduct extensive MMRV; their
reporting (and subsequent verification) requirements have been easier.
While MMRV for Annex 1 nations allows verifiers to review progress
107. See Wettestad, Monitoring and Verification, supra note 71, at 992 (explaining how
monitoring and verification will work under the Kyoto global emissions trading regime); BREIDENICH &
BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 11 (noting that Annex I parties must submit detailed GHG inventories,
which are subject to annual review by expert teams); SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 8-9 (comparing
commitments between Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 parties).
108. See BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 15 ("Annex I parties are required to
provide detailed information on the policies and measures they are implementing to meet their
Convention obligations and their Kyoto targets."); see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 7, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148; Existing
Requirements for Reporting and Review for Annex 1 Parties under the Convention and the Kyoto
Protocol, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/national~reports/reportingand~review_forannex_i_parties/items/
5689.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2013); CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 13/CMP.1, Modalities for the
Accounting of Assigned Amounts Under Article 7, Paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov.
28-Dec. 10, 2005, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Nov. 30, 2005); CoP to the UNFCCC
Dec. 15/CMP.1, Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required Under Article 7 of the
Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 1 1-3,
Annex I(D)(5) (Mar. 30, 2006); CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 16/CMP.1, Decisions Adopted by the
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: Land Use, Land
Use Change and Forestry, Ist Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3,
at 3 (Mar. 30, 2006); CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 19/CMP.1, Guidelines for National Systems Under
Article 5, Paragraph I of the Kyoto Protocol, Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, pmbl., Annex I (Mar. 30, 2006); UNFCCC, Guidelines for the
Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in Annex 1 to the Convention, Part II:
UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on National Communications, U.N. Doc. A/RES/FCCC/CP/1999/7, at
82 (Feb. 16, 2000).
109. BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 14.
110. Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 51.
Ill. See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 3-4 (suggesting improvements to the national
communication process for developing countries).
112.

BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 14.

113. Id. at 15.
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towards GHG reduction goals, MMRV for non-Annex 1 nations is largely
meant as advisory and serves to identify where the international community
might assist in capacity building.'1 4 According to Breidenich & Bodansky,
currently the developing nations' MMRV requirements are "not adequate to
produce accurate, complete, comparable, and transparent GHG
inventories.""'5 Under the principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities (see Part III below), Southern nations may either continue
to have light, and perhaps not particularly meaningful, MMRV regimes or,
with adequate Northern financial support, may have rigorous, meaningful
MMRV requirements."' 6
The South is looking for more rigorous MMRV to ensure that the
Northern nations are reducing as they say they are." 7 GHG accounting
methodologies, particularly under market-based mechanisms (for example,
cap and trade) may be opaque-that is, difficult to fully MMRV."' At the
same time, the North is insisting that Southern nations also make emissions
reduction pledges and that they are monitored and verified." 9 If the current
negotiating track continues, developing nations' GHG inventories will be
limited to Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), and the
actual mitigation actions will be heavily weighted towards forest cover.
Thus, the MMRV for emissions reductions (or reversals) will be governed
by the parameters I discussed above.
For Southern nations, accurate and adequate baseline GHG emissions
would be required-with adequate MMRV-against which to measure
future reductions. Northern nations may want to assess not just developing
nation actions as a proxy for actual reductions, but the results of those
actions-do they actually result in GHG emissions reductions? 20 How
114. Id. at 12-13.
115. Id. at 13.
116. See SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that developed countries should help developing
countries build robust, transparent monitoring systems to track progress in reducing emissions).
117. Southern voices, of course, are not monolithic. There is a perverse incentive for some in the
South to desire that the North not reduce so that the North will keep paying the South to balance the
GHG books.
118. See, e.g., MR V and the Virtues of Clarity, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT'L (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.climatenetwork.org/blog/mrv-and-virtues-clarity (arguing for greater transparency in
MMRV).
119. See Broder, supra note 45 (noting China's insistence on being treated differently from "rich
countries" under the UNCCC); Walsh, supra note 75 (noting that the U.S. insists that developing
countries shoulder the burden of emissions reductions); Todd Stem, Special Envoy for Climate Change,
Remarks at University of Michigan Law School: A New Paradigm: Climate Change Negotiations in the
Post-Copenhagen
Era
(Oct.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/2010/149429.htm (noting that "developing countries agreed that
their implementation would be subject to some measure of international transparency").
120. This is a topic of debate. See REDD-NET, MONITORING, REPORTING AND VERIFICATION OF

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 2 (2010), availableat http://redd-net.org/files/MRV%20of/2OGHG.pdf.
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these nations would report their results, who would verify them, and what
the results of verification would be (merely consultative and supportive, or
with some strictures for failing to meet named targets?) is contentious.121
F. Northern Financialand Technology Pledges
It is not simply that Northern nations are imposing a set of norms with
MMRV strings attached, but that Northern nations are possibly governing
Southern citizens without their consent.122 Southern nations are demanding
MMRV for Northern financial and technical pledges, which they would
then link to concomitant mitigation actions of their own.1 23 The Bali Action
Plan brought this to the fore in its call for "[n]ationally appropriate
mitigation actions ... supported and enabled by technology, financing and
capacity-building, in a measurable reportable and verifiable manner."' 24 In
recent negotiations, India and other developing nations officially submitted
requests that MMRV apply not just to GHG reduction actions, but to
financial and technological support for such actions.125 For example, Tuvalu
submitted a comment noting that:
[w]ith respect to the provision of financing it is our view
that current measures for reporting financial contributions
and
inadequate
are
I
Parties
Annex
by
haphazard..

.

. Tuvalu believes that a process needs to be

established to develop specific reporting guidelines for
financial support.... Tuvalu believes that all financial
contributions made by Annex I Parties need to be reported
in a consistent, transparent and verifiable manner.12 6
The Copenhagen Accord agreed on $30 billion in "new and additional"
fast start finance between 2010-2012 (much of which has not yet been
forthcoming), and for $100 billion per year of finance by 2020.127 However,
121. See id.
122. See Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilateralism, and
International Law, I TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 31, 38 (2012) (explaining that "multilateral decisionmaking not based on consensus would be illegitimate").
123. BRElDENICH & BODANSKY, supranote 38, at 1.
124. UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.13, supra note 41, 1 1(b)(ii).
125. See World Resources Institute, supra note 39, at 16.
126. UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, Work Programme on
EnhancedMeasurement, Reporting and Verification for PartiesIncluded in Annex I to the Convention,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011 /MISC.6/Add.l (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/201 I /awgcal4/eng/miscO6aO 1.pdf.
127. Copenhagen Accord, supranote 15, $ 8.
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negotiators did not define "new and additional."l2 8 This means both that a
clear baseline must be established (so one can verify what is "new" and
"additional"), and the finance data must be available to all interested
partieS.129
Currently, developed nations are required to report financial resources
they dedicate to helping developing nations mitigate their GHG reductions,
adapt to climate change, and fulfill their UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol
requirements (including their MMRV requirements).13 0 But reporting
parameters are inconsistent, and developing nations allege that some
Northern nations have repeatedly pledged aid that was never delivered.13 1
While compliance with financing for other multilateral environmental
agreements has been good, those commitments were a pittance compared to
what Southern nations are asking for,132 and Northern nations are
proposing, in a Kyoto successor.13 3 This prospective transfer of wealth
partially explains why Southern entities would accept intrusive MMRV.
Furthermore, some of what is reported or proposed as new climate
change aid may not genuinely be additional. It may have been pledged
anyway and later counted as new sources of funding, or it was pledged for a
related development goal (e.g., "sustainable forestry") and got redirected or
double counted as "new" climate change aid.134 Stadelmann proposes that
128. Martin Stadelmann, J. Timmons Roberts & Axel Michaelowa, Keeping a Big Promise:
Optionsfor Baselines to Assess "New and Additional" Climate Finance2 (Ctr. for Comparative & Int'l
Studies, Working Paper Nr. 66, 2010), available at http://www.cis.ethz.ch/publications/
publications/2010 WP66_StadelmannMichaelowa.pdf.
129. Id at 8.
130.

BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supranote 38, at 16.

131. See Benito Miller, Is There Room for Compromise? The Debate on Institutional
Arrangements for Climate Finance, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES 1, 8 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/comment_01_10_09.pdf; Stadelmann et al.,
supra note 128, at 2 (observing that the "new and additional" requirements are not clearly defined).
132. For example, China asks that rich nations contribute 1% of GDP to help poor countries
adapt to climate change. Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus
Justice, 85 WASH. L. REv. 293, 295 & n. 1 (2010). Bolivia demands $400 billion for fast track funding
as well as MMRVed 1% of GDP of developed nations; Ghana asks for 1.5% of GDP totaling $100
billion per year by 2020. See World Resources Institute, supra note 39, at 15 (noting that Bolivia has
argued for fast-track funding for REDD+ to the tune of $400 billion).
133. Stadelmann, supranote 128, at 3.
134. See Hunter, supra note 51, at 13 (explaining that a recurring issue in climate financial
architecture is how to ensure that funds earmarked for climate financing are "'new and additional"');
Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Tianjin Climate Meeting Delivers Little, Overshadowed by USChina Spat, 14 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 3, http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/
bridgesweeklyl4-35.pdf ("Concerns persist about whether climate finance would be 'additional' to
planned flows of development aid."); World Resources Institute, supra note 39, at 17 (noting that a
number of Annex I countries are "planning to repackage Overseas Development Assistance rather than
provide new and additional financing required by the UNFCCC"); BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra
note 38, at 16-17, 26 (noting that there is no common standard for determining what climate changerelated aid constitutes "new and additional financing"); Ward, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that there could
be a verification process to track financing for climate change).
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"climate finance is additional if it leads to an increase both compared to
present and projected future development assistance."' 35 It is difficult to
track private investments, or to figure out if these should be included in
developed nations' financial pledges.'3 6 Developing nations (e.g., official
submissions from India, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela) request that
financing not come from the capricious (and difficult to MMRV) carbon
markets, but from consistent government coffers.' 37
G. Biodiversity Protection andSocial Development Benefits
In his analysis of the shifting ground of how political power is wielded
internationally, Nikolas Rose writes that a "new ethical politics has taken
shape . . . [w]hich refuses the idea that politics is a matter of state,

parliament, election and party programme."' 38 Activists work across
international borders and in multiple fora to effect specific kinds of change
they desire-to preserve biodiversity, sustain indigenous peoples'
livelihoods, and/or improve poor peoples' prospects through fairer land
tenure and economic development. Voices in both North and South seek
MMRV for biodiversity protection and social development benefits.
REDD+, when done right, portends large benefits to poor people living
near forests, and to the forest ecosystems upon which they depend.13 9
However, some early REDD+ projects, touted as salvation for biodiversity
and the poor, nonetheless diminished biodiversity (allowing for
monoculture plantations and non-native species) 14 0 or locked up forests
upon which local communities depended, thus dispossessing poor people of
their land or denying them their livelihoods.141
MMRV is a tool to ensure that both the livelihoods of poor peopleand the biodiversity and ecosystem services that form the basis of those

135.
136.
137.
Bolivia, and

Stadelmann, supra note 128, at 4.
Ward, supra note 6, at 2 (questioning the feasibility of tracking various sources of funding).
See World Resources Inst., supra note 39, at 12-13, 16, 19 (noting that India, Argentina,
Venezuela prefer public over private financing).

138. NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 2 (1999).

139. Takacs, A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, supra note 13, at 557; Takacs, Carbon Into Gold,
supranote 26, at 85; TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 5.
140. See Nophea Sasaki & Francis E. Putz, CriticalNeed for New Definitions of "Forest" and
"Forest Degradation" in Global Climate Change Agreements, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 226, 229
(2009) (noting one study, which found that carbon and biodiversity loss resulted when a REDD+
agreement was implemented); Wilson, supra note 25, at 1013.
141. Takacs, A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, supranote 13, at 556, 561 (discussing how projects
may deny employment opportunities or dispossess people of land); TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra
note 16, at 23, 51; Takacs, Carbon Into Gold, supra note 26, at 85; Densham et al., supranote 25, at ii;
REDD-MONITOR, supranote 26; Wilson, supranote 25, at 10 12-14.
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livelihoods-are enhanced through REDD+.142 Thus conservation and propoor groups in both the North and South call for MMRV of social and
ecological safeguards for REDD+. If investors are going to appropriate
(even with compensation) Southern forests, they will need to be
accountable for protecting and ameliorating the livelihoods and basic rights
of forest dependent communities, and for protecting and enhancing the
diverse species that live in tropical forests. Northern government leaders
(and pro-poor and conservation NGOs) want assurances that funds for
REDD+ genuinely reduce emissions, preserve biodiversity, and alleviate
poverty (and will continue to do so for the contracted duration of a

project).143
So, for example, the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance
(CCBA) has put together "REDD+ Social & Environmental Standards" for
individual REDD+ projects, albeit with an eye towards having nations or
subnational entities adopt these as uniform standards for all REDD+
projects in their jurisdiction.'" These standards safeguard local peoples'
rights, ensure that local peoples (especially indigenous peoples) are full and
equal participants and beneficiaries in REDD+ projects, and that REDD+
projects maintain and enhance biodiversity and ecosystem services.145 The
Standards contain criteria and indicators that would allow results to be
measured, monitored, reported, and verified. Of particular focus in the
standards is a set of MMRV criteria for stakeholder participation in all
phases of project management.14 6 And CCBA and other NGOs have put
together a comprehensive "Manual for Social Impact Assessment of LandBased Carbon Projects," resulting in "REDD+ SES (Social and
Environmental Safeguards)" to guarantee community and ecological co-

142. John Costenbader and I have each provided a full accounting of what a maximally
equitable REDD+ project would comprise. See JOHN COSTENBADER, UN-REDD+ PROGRAMME,
REDD+ BENEFIT SHARING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREE NATIONAL POLICY APPROACHES

10 (2010) (defining "equity" in the context of REDD+ programs); Takacs, A Deep Equity Analysis,
supra note 13, passim (analyzing forest carbon projects and introducing "deep equity").
143. See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR ENvT. & DEV., CARBON RIGHTEOUSNESS: How To LEVER PRO-

available at www.iied.org/pubs/
BENEFITS FROM REDD+
1 (July 2011),
POOR
display.php?o=1709711ED (arguing that REDD+ projects must bestow social, economic and
environmental benefit on a variety of forest-dependent peoples and communities).
144. See REDD+ SES, supra note 22, at 2-3 (establishing a set of standards that can be tailored
to each specific country, but that can be consistently applied through an international review process).
CCBA is itself a coalition of NGOs (e.g., Conservation International and CARE), international
institutions (e.g., CIFOR), and business interests (e.g., Weyerhaeuser). Id.
145. See id. at 3, 8, 10; see also Takacs, A Deep Equity Analysis, supra note 13, at 536
(describing the goal of the Climate, Community &Biodiversity Alliance).
146. See NICHOLAS MOSS & RUTH NUSSBAUM, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, A REVIEW OF THREE

REDD+ SAFEGUARD INITIATIVES 15-16 (2011), available at http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/otherpublications/a-review-of-three-redd-safeguard-initiatives/.
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benefits from REDD+ through naming measurable indicators and exploring
how to monitor and verify that these indicators have been achieved.147
Sovereignty, as we shall see below, is likely to be a sticking point in
international agreements for MMRV for social and biodiversity issues.14 8
For Clean Development Mechanism projects under the Kyoto Protocol, a
host nation's "Designated National Authority," or "DNA," approves or
disapproves a given project according to sustainable development criteria
designed by each nation.149 As Chilean attorney Marcos Orellana puts it, the
CDM regards this determination as an expression of the
sovereignty of the host State, and it does not provide for
international scrutiny of it. Therefore, the CDM does not
require that the DNA establish an open and participatory
process when defining sustainable development criteria, or
when making determinations regarding the contribution of
projects to sustainability.so
In the private market, a host nation may have no oversight of social or
biodiversity benefits from a project. It may simply be a financial transaction
between actors (and actors of unequal bargaining power or legal acuity, at
that).' 5 ' Thus activists from within and outside richly forested nations are
calling for more rigorous MMRV to ensure that REDD+ aid enhances
biodiversity conservation and improves the livelihoods of local
communities.
In their submissions to the FCPF, many nations' REDD+ Readiness
Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) contemplate extensive MMRV of
socioeconomic benefits and safeguards. Argentina proposes that "[s]ocioeconomic monitoring will apply poverty reduction and job creation
indicators..

.

. The Argentine Labour and Environment Program is in

process to develop indicators related to climate change and labour."' 5 2 The
147. See MICHAEL RICHARDS & STEVE PANFIL, MANUAL FOR SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF
LAND-BASED CARBON PROJECTS: PART I - CORE GUIDANCE FOR PROJECT PROPONENTS 4-5 (2010),

available at http://www.climate-standards.org/docs/assessment/SocialImpactAssessmentforLandbasedCarbonProjectsPart I.pdf (explaining social impacts).
148. REDDNET, MONITORING, REPORTING AND SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 2 (2010),

availableat http://redd-net.org/files/MRV%20of%2Osocial%20development.pdf.
149. Wilson, supra note 25, at 1020-21 (exploring how international law can overcome the
impediments of sovereignty to allow for "victims" of REDD+ and other offsets to pursue remedies).
150. MARCOS ORELLANA, CTR. FOR INT'L ENvTL. LAW, Change and the Right to Development:
InternationalCooperation,FinancialArrangements, and the Clean Development Mechanism 24 (2010),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/right/docs/A-HRC-1 5-WG-2-TF-CRP-3-Revl .pdf.
151. Takacs, Carbon Into Gold, supra note 26, at 86.
152. ARGENTINA R-PP, supranote 105, at 72.
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Central African Republic plans development criteria and indicators to
include "infrastructure, demographics, level of employment, type of
employment, employment of indigenous peoples, local average income,"
and human rights indicators to include "[g]ender issues, security measures,
[and] labor policy for REDD+ projects."'
Similarly, the R-PPs propose extensive MMRV for biodiversity cobenefits. So, for example, Colombia plans to monitor and report REDD
programs' impacts on:
Number of extinct, endangered, threatened, vulnerable and
endemic species per group[;] Absolute and relative
abundance, density, basal area and coverage of various
species[;] Changes in the period of absolute and relative
abundances of species[;] Species richness[;] Species used
by local communities[;] Population parameters of
153.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC R-PP, supra note 105, at 4; see also BURKINA FASO,

READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 118 (2012) [hereinafter BURKINA FASO R-PP], available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/June

2012/R-PP%20Burkina%20English-%2OFINAL%2OJune%202012.pdf;

REPUBLIC

OF

COLOMBIA,

READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 140-144 (2011) [hereinafter COLOMBIA R-PP], available at

http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct
2011/ColombiaR-PPRevised-%20English-%2September/2029%2C%202011.pdf;
CAMBORDIA RPP, supra note 105, at 92-93; Gov'T OF COSTA RICA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 89 (2010)
[hereinafter COSTA RICA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Sep20lO/R-PPCosta Rica English 08-19-10.pdf;
ETHIOPIA R-PP, supra note 105, at 141-42; REPUBLIC OF GHANA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL
70 (2010) [hereinafter GHANA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jan2Ol 1/RevisedGhanaR-PP_2_Dec-201 0.pdf;
GUATEMALA R-PP, supra note 105, at 104; Gov'T OF KENYA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 7374 (2010) [hereinafter KENYA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct2Ol O/Revised%2ORPP%20for/o2OKenya.pdf;
LAOS R-PP, supra note 104, at 60-61, 101; REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL
134-37 (2012) [hereinafter LIBERIA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/
sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Apr2012/Liberia%20R%2OPP revised April%202012
.pdf; MADAGASCAR R-PP, supra note 105, at 84; GOv'T OF MOZAMBIQUE, READINESS PREPARATION
PROPOSAL
136-37,
147-49 (2012)
[hereinafter
MOZAMBIQUE
R-PP],
available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Mar
2012/MozambiqueRPP_March072012rev2-FINAL.pdf, Gov'T OF NEPAL, NEPAL'S READINESS
PREPARATION PROPOSAL REDD 2010-2013 6 (2010) [hereinafter NEPAL R-PP], available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct
2010/R-PPNepal revisedOctober.pdf; GOV'T OF PANAMA, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 1011 (2009) [hereinafter PANAMA R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Docunents/PDF/Feb201O/Panana R-Plan rev_05-16-09 with disclaimer.pdf;
PERU R-PP, supra note 105, at 129-30; TANZANIA R-PP, supra note 105, at 58; UGANDA R-PP, supra
note 105, at 134, 143; SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, READINESS PREPARATION PROPOSAL 84
(2011) [hereinafter VIETNAM R-PP], available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Nov2Ol INiet/o2ONam%20R-PPRevised%2018%20
November201 1.pdf.
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functional or indicator species[;] Changes in species
composition over time[;] Number and abundance of
invasive species[;] Area, length, and number of biological
corridors[; and] Relationship between forest cover and

flood frequency.15 4
If realized, this degree of external scrutiny has no parallel in international
environmental law. For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) has some MMRV requirements, but they pale in comparison to
REDD+ proposals. In the CBD, parties are required to identify components
of biological diversity important for conservation and sustainable use, and
monitor these components, particularly those that are threatened; it doesn't
stipulate how rigorously this occurs.155 Article 21 leaves it to the
Conference of parties to determine how funding will be monitored, and
tasks the CoP to "review the effectiveness" of the funding mechanism "on a
regular basis." 15 6 Parties are to report activities likely to affect biological
diversity beyond the country's control (Article 14d), and report to the CBD
measures they are taking to implement the Convention. (Article 26).15' This
has not been particularly effective, as "the ability of the Conference of the
Parties to fulfill this [reviewing] role has been hampered by the lack of
adequate information received from Parties on measures taken to implement
the provisions of the Convention and their effectiveness." 5 s Current
guidelines, for reports due in 2014, ask for updates on biodiversity status,
action plans, and progress towards achieving goals, but offer little more
than qualitative requests to "describe" or "analyse." 5 9 Virtually no
verification of party monitoring or reporting takes place. Thus, current

154. COLOMBIA R-PP, supranote 153, at 141. Colombia also proposes extensive Environmental
Monitoring of other variables. See id. at 141-44; see also ARGENTINA R-PP, supra note 152, at 71-72;
COSTA RICA R-PP, supra note 153, at 89; DRC R-PP, supra note 105, at 114; ETHIOPIA R-PP, supra
note 105, at 140; GHANA R-PP, supra note 153, at 71, 98; KENYA R-PP, supra note 153, at 74-75;
LIBERIA R-PP, supra note 153, at 134; MADAGASCAR R-PP, supra note 105, at 84; , supra note 153, at
136-37, 149; PANAMA R-PP, supra note 153, at 36; PERU R-PP, supra note 105, at 102, 129-30;
TANZANIA R-PP, supra note 105, at 58; UGANDA R-PP, supra note 105, at 134, 143; VIETNAM R-PP,
supranote 153, at 84-87.
155. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 7, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into
force Dec. 29, 1993)
156. Id. art. 21.
157. Id. art. 14(d), 26.
158. Exec. Sec'y of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Reporting Mechanisms Under the
Convention and Other Conventions, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-R1/1/10 (July 27, 2005).
159. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, GUIDELINES FOR THE FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT,

available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/nr/nr-05/NR5-guidelines-en.pdf (fifth national report due to CBD by
Mar. 31, 2014).
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biodiversity and social impact monitoring for REDD+, if implemented,
would take MMRV in Multinational Agreements to a new level.
Why is REDD+ MMRV regime different? It is different because so
many different interests are reciprocally seeking verification of so many
different things. While surveillance regimes have long existed in arms
control, these are limited to a few nations under the auspices of official
national inspectors, and the United Nations. The World Bank has long
placed conditionalities on its loans to developing nations, with monitoring
strings attached to ensure the recipient is doing as it pledges. Similarly, the
Global Environmental Facility attaches MMRV-like conditions to its loans
to developing nations. But, especially in these latter two cases, we have
monolithic organizations, largely controlled by the North, dictating the
terms of engagement to disempowered Southern nations.
Forests-especially now, in the age of carbon desperation-are giving
way to a different, more comprehensive, more multivocal, more complex,
and more equal surveillance regime. A dizzing array of actors-national
and subnational leaders, NGOs, industries, private citizens in North and
South-are proposing and negotiating the MMRV regime for REDD+,
seeking to be part of the experts and benefactors who will control the
REDD+ regime and thus benefit from the diverse values diverse
stakeholders find in the South's cherished forests.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF REDD+ MMRV
A. Copenhagen, 2009
From CoP meetings in Bali (December 2007) to Copenhagen
(December 2009), negotiators squabbled over what to measure, how to
measure it, and who should have what measured, and by whom. The
Copenhagen Accord-a non-binding political (as opposed to legally
binding) agreement-calls for "rigorous, robust and transparent" MMRV of
developed nations' emissions reductions as well as MMRV of these
nations' financial pledges to developed nations.160
In the Copenhagen Accord, the developed world committed to naming
their own enhanced GHG reductions, and agreed that "[d]elivery of
reductions and financing. . . will be measured, reported and verified in
accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the
Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets
and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent."' 6' Currently, under the
160. Copenhagen Accord, supranote 15, 1 4.
161. Id 4.
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UNFCCC, developed nations submit National Communications where they
are required to report their actual GHG emissions yearly, and emissions
reduction actions every four to six years.16 2
What the developing world would do to mitigate GHG reductions, if
anything, was significantly more contentious. Eventually, developing nations
committed to report on their GHG "nationally appropriate mitigation actions"
via National Communications every two years, subject to some form of
"international consultations and analysis"-code for MvRV.16 3 The
compromise MMRV regime for these NAMAs calls for some form of
external MMRV for NAMAs supported by international aid. Self-supported
NAMAs (i.e. not funded by the North) would be reported biennially in
national communications, subject to "international consultations and
analysis," or ICA. ICA modalities remained to be worked out, but the
Accord assured "clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national
sovereignty is respected."'6 " This is the first time developing nations agreed
to international MMRV for their climate change mitigation and adaptation
actions.' 65 I will discuss below what this means for "national sovereignty."
Furthermore, as discussed above, the developed countries pledge to
increase funding to $100 billion per year by 2020 from various sources, but
place that aid "[i]n the context of meaningful mitigation actions and
transparency on implementation ....
Here, this "transparency" is code
for a suite of MMRV-able governance reforms to ensure that Northern aid
is fairly and efficaciously spent.
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord includes REDD+
as a fundamental element, and calls for "the immediate establishment of a
mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial
resources from developed countries."

162. SCHMIDT, supranote 9, at 2.
163. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 15.
164. Id. 5.
165. Bodansky, supra note 45, at 240. See also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President During Press Availability in Copenhagen (Dec. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press-availability-copenhagen
("The challenge here was that for a lot of countries, particularly those emerging countries that are still in
different stages of development, this is going to be the first time in which even voluntarily they offered
up mitigation targets.") President Obama added, "I think that it was important to essentially get that shift
in orientation moving, that's what I think will end up being most significant about this accord." Id.
166. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 8.
167. Id. T 6.
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Cancun, 2010

Despite doom and gloom skepticism heading into the Cancun CoP,
negotiators built on the three-page Copenhagen Accord by turning out a
detailed, thirty-page, near unanimous agreement that filled in significant
details.16' The Cancun Agreement reaffirms the Copenhagen Accprd's
decision for the developed world to provide US$30 billion in "fast track"
aid between 2010 and 2012, and $100 billion per year by 2020, to be
channeled through a "Green Climate Fund." While these provisions are not
yet legally binding, they set the stage for a potentially legally binding
treaty.
Developed countries would improve their MMRV of emissions
reductions, as well as financial support to developing nations. The
Agreement calls for "enhance[d] guidelines for the review of information in
national communications," particularly in "[p]rogress made in achieving
emission reductions" and "[p]rovision of financial, technology and
capacity-building support to developing country Parties." 69 In other words,
the South received concessions that Northern nations would be subject to
stricter oversight to ensure that they lived up to their promises to actually
reduce GHG emissions and to actually deliver new, additional aid that they
pledge.
On the other hand, the Cancun Agreement expands developing
countries' MMRV requirements. First, the agreement gingerly approaches
MMRV for the biennial reports and National Communications that
Southern nations will be required to submit. The Conference of the Parties:
Decides to conduct a process for international consultations
and analysis of biennial reports in the Subsidiary Body on
Implementation, in a manner that is non-intrusive, nonpunitive and respectful of national sovereignty; the
international consultations and analysis aim to increase
transparency of mitigation actions and their effects, through
analysis by technical experts in consultation with the Party
168. Richard Black, Cancun: The Chihuahua That Roared, B.B.C. NEWS (Dec. 11, 2010, 11:29
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/2010/12/cancunthechihuahua-that
roar.html. Only Bolivia's President Evo Morales objected, and meeting chair (Mexican Secretary for
Foreign Affairs) Patricia Espinosa Figueroa noted that and moved right along. Louise Gray, Cancun
Climate Change Summit: Bolivians Dance to a Different Beat, But Fail to Derail the Talks, THE
TELEGRAPH

(Dec.

12,

2010,

4:36

PM),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8197539/Cancun-climate-change-summitBolivians-dance-to-a-different-beat-but-fail-to-derail-the-talks.html.
169. Cancun Agreements, supra note 28, % 40, 42.
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concerned, and through a facilitative sharing of views, and
will result in a summary report.170
In addition to these biennial updates, developing nations will be
required to submit full National Communications every four years,
according to guidelines yet to be developed. These will be subject to
"international consultation and analysis" (ICA), including a "facilitative
sharing of views"-a gentle MMRV regime, but an MMRV regime
nonetheless. 7
The Agreement builds on the NAMAs first named in the Copenhagen
Accord, with the provisos that these NAMAs depend on financial and
technology contributions from the North and that sustainable development
is the first priority of the South.172 The Agreement sets up a registry for the
South to ask for funds to support NAMAs.1 73 Most importantly for our
purposes, the Agreement sets up a two-track system for MMRV for
developing country NAMAs. First, "internationally supported mitigation
actions will be measured, reported and verified domestically and will be
subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in
accordance with guidelines to be developed under the Convention."l 74 Selffunded NAMAs, however, will face domestic MMRV requirements
according to guidelines to be developed. 75
The Cancun Agreement emphasizes the importance of including
REDD+ in future binding agreements, and requests "[a] robust and
transparent national forest monitoring system for the monitoring and
reporting of' REDD+ activities.1 76 And, importantly, the Agreement
requests a "system for providing information on how the safeguards
referred to in appendix I to this decision are being addressed and respected
throughout the implementation of [REDD+], while respecting
sovereignty." 7 7 Annex I specifies that REDD+ must include "safeguards"
that protect natural forests and functioning ecosystems, enhance sustainable
development and poverty reduction, enhance forest government "taking into
account national legislation and sovereignty," and respect knowledge and
rights of local communities and indigenous peoples, including full

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id 63.
Id.
See id. pt. HI(B) pmbl.,
Id. 53-59.
Id. 61.
Id. 62.
Id. 71(c).
Id. 71(d).

52.
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participation rights.178 While the Agreement discusses the goal of positive
"economic and social consequences of response measures,"1 79 it doesn't
discuss MMRV of these consequences, except in the context of REDD+.
Furthermore, even in the context of REDD+, the Agreement calls only for a
"system for providing information on how the safeguards . . . are being

addressed and respected throughout the implementation of the
activities . . . while respecting sovereignty."180 Thus, there are no specifics
yet for MMRV, and the "while respecting sovereignty" language suggests
opposition from developing nations to intrusive MMRV.18 1
C. Durban,2011
The CoP in Durban in December 2011 largely kicked the can down the
road, aiming for "an agreed outcome with legal force" in 2015 to go into
effect by 2020.182 Daniel Bodansky describes it as "an empty vessel that can
be filled with whatever content the parties choose."l 83
REDD+ did advance in Durban. Although the exact financing and
precise safeguards (with MMRV for both) remain to be negotiated, the final
documents require that countries receiving "results-based finance" to
implement REDD+ engage in actions that are "fully measured, reported and
verified."1 84 The committees settled on a REDD+ measuring and reporting
system to be measured in more easily verifiable carbon emissions (as
opposed to hectares). The report did not conclude how the actual
verification would work.

178. Id app. I at 2(b).
179. Id pt. HI(E).
180. Id 71(d).
181. KATE DOOLEY, FERN, FOREST WATCH SPECIAL REPORT-UNFCCC CLIMATE TALKS,
CANCUN,
DECEMBER 2010
(2011),
available at http://www.fem.org/sites/fem.org/files/
Cancun%20update.pdf (suggesting that Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, and Costa Rica weakened
MMRV language here).
182. CoP to the UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add. 1, 2 (Dec. 11, 2011).
183. Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options, HARVARD
PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, at 3 (July 10, 2012), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
Delivery.cfn/SSRN ID2109588_code36681 1.pdf?abstractid=2102994&mirid=5.
184. UNFCCC Dec. 2/CP.17, supra note 11, at 15; Cancun Agreements, supra note 29, 1 73.
But see Leony Aurora, REDD+ Draft Texts Postpone Financing Decision to 2012, Water Down
Safeguards," FORESTS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2011), http://blog.cifor.org/5655/redd-draft-texts-postponefinancing-decision-to-2012-water-down-safeguards/ (noting that, in Durban, there were "very weak"
MMRV safeguards, requiring countries only to submit "qualitative information on how safeguards were
implemented").
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Beyond REDD+, the Durban Platform requires that developing nations
must submit annual GHG inventories, and biennial reports on progress
towards achieving their NAMAs.' 85 The Platform requests further MMRV
development for developing nation NAMAs' 86 that is "non-intrusive, nonpunitive and respectful of national sovereignty."' The agreements also
reaffirmed commitments for Northern nation donations to the Green
Climate Fund, including donations that would specifically support
REDD+.188
The legal details of MMRV will not be colored in before the current
Kyoto Protocol-and concomitant GHG reducing commitment periodexpires in 2012.189 But the system of MMRV: a) will be a portion of any
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, should one occur; b) may well be a model
for REDD+ and other components of regional or bilateral climate change
deals; c) pose a model for voluntary market REDD+ deals; and d) present a
way forward for any parties looking to realize the synergistic effects of
REDD+ (or any other climate change solutions) while clamoring over the
berm of mistrust that has come to characterize international environmental
law in the climate change era.
D. Doha, 2012
The underwhelming "Doha Climate Gateway" commits many nations
(Canada, Russia, Japan, and New Zealand opted out; some nations took on
new commitments) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.190 No decisions
about REDD+ were made in Doha, with negotiations foundering over
MMRV. In particular, objections by Brazil and Norway concerned the

185. UNFCCC Dec. 2/CP. 17, supra note 11, at 40; Cancun Agreements, supranote 28, 60(c).
186. Id. 63.
187. Id.
188. See Jake Schmidt, ImportantProgress at Global Warming Negotiations in Durban;Major
Work Ahead, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Dec. 11, 2011), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jschmidt/
important_progress at global w.html (describing the launch of the Green Climate Fund); see also
Cancun Agreements, supranote 28, $ 100, 102 (establishing the Green Climate Fund).
189. See Antonio G.M. La Vina et al., Found. for Int'l Law & Dev., The UNFCCC After
Durban: Recognizing Limitations and Calling for a Multi-Track Approach to Climate Multilateralism
and
Action
4,
10
(May
2012),
available
at
http://www.field.org.uk/files/
unfcccafter durban lavina may 2012.pdf (noting that the details surrounding a market-based
approach to REDD under the UNFCCC are still being ironed out, but that policy makers are striving to
mobilize private finance for REDD programs in the future).
190. See JESSICA BOYLE, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., A MIRAGE INTHE DESERTS OF
DOHA? ASSESSING
THE OUTCOMES OF COP 18 at 2-3
(2012), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/com-miragedesert-dohacopl8.pdf (noting that Canada, Russia, New
Zealand, and Japan will not participate in in the "Doha Climate Gateway").
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verification of emission reductions from forests cover.'9 Norway was
requesting that future REDD+ aid be tied to independent, international,
"results-based" verification; Brazil and other Southern nations wanted no
such verification commitments.192 As international multilateral negotiations
continue under the UN's auspices, the future of REDD+ will continue to
focus on MMRV.
III. MMRV FOR REDD+, COOPERATIVE SOVEREIGNTY, AND
REALIGNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Taking action to mitigate GHG buildup and help communities adapt to
global climate change-while simultaneously reducing poverty, and
staunching deforestation-will take an unprecedented degree of cooperation
among nations; between nations and emerging, diverse non-state actors; and
among those actors themselves. The urgent need to cooperate occurs at a
time of marked mistrust not only between nations, but between these
nations and diverse interest groups staking their claims to power. The
current debates around MMRV for REDD+, and the resolutions emerging
from these debates, present a possible roadmap for how international law is
changing and must change if we are to confront the harsh realities that
climate change holds for current and future generations of humans and
nonhumans. Disparate actors promoting MMRV for REDD+ are
negotiating a new model of reciprocal, cooperative, mutually beneficial,
contractual sovereignty. This model not only can help realize the synergistic
effects of REDD+, but provides a roadmap for cooperation towards
equitable resolutions to other pressing international problems.
As more actors come to cherish forests for more reasons, those who
possess them-disproportionately, communities and nations in the global
South-acquire more power, more leverage, and more bargaining chips in
international relations. Forests help bring "sovereign equality" among
nations closer to reality, as Southern nations put their forests up for bids to
fulfill their "common but differentiated responsibilities," and gain cash,
clout, and ecological resilience in the process. As forests increasingly
191. Chris Lang, REDD at COP18, Doha: At A Crossroadsor Stuck in Neoliberalism's Dead
End?, REDD-MONITOR (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2012/12/14/redd-at-copl8-dohaat-a-crossroads-or-stuck-in-neoliberalisms-dead-end/?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=email
&utm-campaign=Feed%3A+Redd-monitor+%28REDD-Monitor%29.
192. REDD+ Negotiations in Doha at Impasse, Potentially Delaying Decisions on Safeguards
Another Year, MONGA BAY (Dec. 3, 2012), http://news.mongabay.com/2012/1203-redd-dohaupdate.html; Steve Zwick, REDD+ Sidelined in Dispute Over Verification, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE
(Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page id=9466&
section=newsarticles&eod=1.
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become a contested negotiating site for who has what sovereign rights to
control the Earth's ecological systems, mutual insistence on reciprocal, quid
pro quo MMRV for REDD+ provides a paradigmatic example for how
"sovereignty" is being reconstructed to forge contractual cooperation
among nations and between nations and emerging powerful actors.
A. A Very BriefIntroductionto "Sovereignty"

"Sovereignty" is the "most fundamental principle"' 93 and "the
cornerstone of international law."' 94 Despite its centrality, what comprises
"sovereignty" remains contentious and unfocused. Different scholars define
it in different ways and different nations assert its meanings in different
ways, depending upon context and goals.'95
Franz Perrez calls it "one of the most often used, defended, and
contested terms of international law,"' 96 and thus the various definitions of
sovereignty are worth parsing, particularly when such parsing can lead to a
more just world and a more sustainable system of interrelationships among
nations, and between national leaders and their own citizens. Sovereignty,
like other legal memes, evolves-but not in a blind way. It evolves as
human actors and human needs push it to evolve. In the instant case, it
evolves as the natural world's demands require us to rethink how our most
cherished or even ossified legal institutions function, and what work they
do, and should do, for us.
Teasing out what sovereignty means in the global climate change era
-and how a reciprocal MMRV scheme for REDD+ may hold a key to
understanding-is important in three ways.
Practically,the parameters of an MMRV regime are one of the major
stumbling blocks in negotiations over cooperation to succeed the Kyoto
Protocol, and are now obligatory for any REDD+ regime. The South,
complaining that the North violates its sovereignty through environmental
destruction from GHG pollution, similarly resists further sovereignty
violations that would accrue when MIMRV is the price to pay for REDD+
funding.'9 7 The North argues that the South's forests are crucial to climate
193. French, supranote 12, at 377.
194. Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad: Private Property
Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environmental Protection, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 539, 540
(1997).
195. See, e.g., FRANZ XAVER PERREZ, COOPERATIVE SOVEREIGNTY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 14-15 (2000)

(comparing different definitions of sovereignty).
196. Id. at 1.
197. See HARALD WINKLER ET AL., BASIC EXPERTS, EQUITABLE ACCESS TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 7 (2011), available at
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change mitigation and biodiversity conservation, both actions and values
whose importance transcend national boundaries.19 8 Finding an MMRV
system that transforms competing priorities into cooperative goals means
multiple (possibly enormous) benefits to North and South, and to human
and nonhuman communities alike.
Legally, if the meaning of sovereignty is evolving-if it can be violated
at will by the actions of the North, if it can be sold to the highest bidder and
divided into quanta, if non-State actors are gaining control of forests
through cross-boundary REDD+ deals, how do we understand
sovereignty? 99 Can a nation auction off enough of its sovereignty, or lose
enough through GHG pollution, so that it has nothing left? Do we need a
new vision of what this concept means to contend with pressing,
transnational environmental problems? I contend that an equitable,
reciprocal MMRV system helps remake sovereignty (for the better) for the
global climate change era.
Ethically, global climate change portends drastic changes in ecological
conditions that will be predominantly borne by the poorest of the poor in
the global South, whose citizens have done little to create the catastrophe.2 00
As their sovereign rights to ecological sustenance are violated and leaders'
sovereign responsibility to care for their peoples' needs is impaired, can we
derive a new idea of sovereignty that accounts for ecological destruction
where some entities pay to maintain the sovereignty of others? Furthermore,
global climate change threatens individuals and ecosystems everywhere:
Where survival on an interdependent, ecologically connected planet is at
stake, ensuring that sovereignty and arguments on its behalf do not hinder,
and in fact facilitate, global cooperation to ward off ecological disaster, is a
crucial project for international environmental law.20 1
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Basic_ExpertsPaper.pdf (explaining the inequality of GHG pollution between
the North and the South); Gardner, supra note 194, at 590 (noting that a state may be unwilling to accept
conditional aid because "such aid is an affront to its sovereignty").
198. See Thilo Marauhn, Changing Role of the State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 728, 730 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (noting that the environment and natural
resources "do not necessarily conform to the territorial boundaries agreed upon between sovereign
states").
199. See Tyler Welti, Market Sovereignty: Managing the Commodity of Sovereign Rights, 21
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 337, 343 (2009) (describing changes in how the modem world understands
state sovereignty).
200. See Burkett, supra note 5, at 513-14; WINKLER, supra note 197, at 4.
201. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:

SYNTHESIs
REPORT
62
(2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-anddatal
publications ipcc fourth_ assessment report-synthesis report.htm (noting that there is a great deal of
agreement that international and regional cooperation have been effective in addressing climate change,
and that the international community should continue with such cooperative efforts); Joe Romm, New
Study of GreenlandUnder "More Realistic Forcings" Concludes "Collapseof the Ice-Sheet Was Found
to Occur Between 400 and 560 PPM" of C02, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 23, 2010, 6:01 PM),
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As greenhouse gas pollution creates ever-greater threats to human
communities and ecological integrity, and as forests and their multiple
benefits diminish, the MMRV regimes proposed for REDD+ climate
change mitigation and adaptation show how treaty negotiators, political
leaders, and social and environmental activists are (wittingly or not)
constructing a new version of sovereignty that is more cooperative, more
reciprocal, more equitable, and more likely to result in outcomes that
preserve rather than impinge upon sovereignty.
B.

Sovereignty as Social Construct

Biersteker and Weber declare that sovereignty is "an ambiguous
concept. Attention to sovereignty tends to raise more questions about
international relations than it answers." 202 What an entity says in the name
of sovereignty may say more about them than it does about the precise legal
parameters of the term. As leaders, scholars, and jurists make claims about
sovereignty, they are, in fact, making sovereignty, nudging its precise legal
boundaries in one direction or another.
While various parties may attempt to impose their own definitions on
sovereignty, "[d]isputes over fundamentally contested concepts cannot be
brought to closure by means of a definition."2 03 Sovereignty has been and
continues to be socially constructed.204 Sovereignty has:
evolved through negotiations over the centuries..

.

. [It is]

a historical relative notion, variable in time and responding
to new situations and exigencies . . ..

[Sovereignty is]

dynamic and variable ... [and should be] examined in
relation with . . . the needs and requirements of its time.205
According to Biersteker and Weber, "[t]he modem state system is not
based on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a
normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society,
nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the
state)." 2 06 Sovereignty has no timeless feature, but is continually being

http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2010/03/23/205696/greenland-ice-sheet-collapse-global-warmingscience/ (warning of possible climate change impacts).
202. Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State Sovereignty, in
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 2 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 3.
205. PERREZ, supra note 195, at 245.
206. Biersteker & Weber, supra note 202, at 3.
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negotiated and renegotiated, with various actors pushing those negotiations
according to changing social needs.207
International environmental law in general, and the physical realities of
climate change and deforestation in particular, exert additional pressure in
"sovereignty" negotiations. Those exigencies are exigent because ecological
systems do not bow before human institutional constructions; law must
eventually bend to the demands of the natural world, or the natural world
will eventually render that law (and the humans who composed it) obsolete.
Global climate change is exerting a kind of natural selection that world
leaders and legal scholars might prefer to ignore, but cannot: Change the
law (and enforce it), or many people will suffer, and (not coincidentally)
many species will go extinct.
Actors constructing an MMRV regime show this negotiation in action.
They are constructing sovereignty. They are, consciously or not, remaking
the bounds of what sovereignty means in an era when nations of the world
must cooperate or face unprecedented pollution, unprecedented cost to
mitigate that pollution, or worse.
Not all legal scholars are enamored of the concept of sovereignty.
Louis Henkin, for example, exhorted the legal world to "extirpate the
term . .. and forbid its uses in polite political or intellectual company or in
international law." 2 08 My goal here, however, is not to extirpate the term:
That's a quixotic task. Rather, I wish to trace how it is being molded-and
participate in that molding-so that sovereignty better reflects current and
future ecological and geopolitical realities.
Perrez urges a "functional analysis" to investigate whether a particular
understanding of sovereignty is "functional,"-that is, "whether it serves
and promotes the goals and purposes to which sovereignty pertains." 209 In
his book Cooperative Sovereignty, Perrez asserts that international
cooperation is not only normatively desirable, but it is the cornerstone of
the only rational legal understanding of "sovereignty," particularly when
environmental threats know no national boundaries and can only be
rationally countered through interdependent cooperation.210
While Perrez urges a rational or self-interested approach to finding
purpose in international law, I am looking for something that combines self207. Id at 11, 18.
208.

Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW NEWSLETTER, Mar.

1993.
209. PERREZ, supra note 195, at 177.
210. Id. at 241-42; see also Frank Bierrmann & Klaus Dingwerth, Global Environmental
Change and the Nation State, 4 GLOBAL ENvTL. POL. 1, 4-5 (2004) (noting that a state's environmental
quality depends not only on its actions, but the actions of its neighbors as well; therefore, international
cooperation is essential to resolving transboundary environmental problems).
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interested proclamations with a normative approach. How nations do shape
sovereignty to serve their own ends should not be divorced from how
nations and individual actors within those nations should shape
sovereignty-not merely to advance their own self interests, but to act on
behalf of neighboring nations and their citizens; distant nations and their
citizens; future generations; and the oft-forgotten non-human individuals,
species, ecosystem processes, and the perpetuation of the ongoing pageant
of evolution. I have written before about "deep equity"-laws and policies
that simultaneously and synergistically promote the health and potential of
individuals, communities, and ecosystems. 2 11 That, I believe, is an
interlocking system of normative goals to which a functional construction
of "sovereignty" should aim. Furthermore, I believe that negotiations over
MMRV for REDD+ do, in fact, aim towards these interlocking goals.
To put it another way, survival of the planet's life systems, and the life
systems of numerous local communities, is at stake. If we are looking to
construct and buttress a definition of sovereignty and looking for a goal that
definition would serve, survival of the human species and the millions of
species with which we share the planet seems like a reasonable target. And
the only way we can get there is through an understanding of "sovereignty"
that foregrounds cooperation. MMRV for REDD+ symbolizes that
cooperation. But it's not altruistic cooperation: It's tit for tat, everyone-wins
cooperation that shows us a way forward for other pressing international
issues that do not recognize or respect national borders.
Herein I trace how actors in the REDD+ MMRV debate are nudging
the construction of sovereignty in a particular, cooperative, and reciprocal
direction, and I assist in nudging the construction of sovereignty in that
direction. MMRV negotiations are about righting the balance between
independence and interdependence, isolation and cooperation. Debates over
MMRV are debates over sovereignty, whether or not they're framed in
those terms. They are debates between Northern nations with traditional
hegemonic power imposing conditions on nations with less power, and
those nations in turn resisting and making counter demands, based on their
growing clout as guardians of the world's increasingly valuable forests.
Nations of North and South each have resources prized by the other, and
each exercise their sovereignty in attempting to exact some demands while
deflecting others. By balancing what nations (and non-national
stakeholders) have to do-and who gets to ensure that they have done what
they say they have done-nations protect their sovereignty, and enhance
survival of human and nonhuman communities in the process.
211.

See Takacs, A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, supra note 13, at 526 (defining "deep equity").
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E. Definitions ofSovereignty: Traditionaland Not so Much
The contours of sovereignty form and reform depending on context,
speaker, era, and need. Traditionally, sovereignty connoted that a
government controls its own political and ecological affairs within a
defined geographical area.212 In Europe in 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia
replaced a hierarchical ruling structure (with the Pope and the Holy Roman
Emperor at the top of the hierarchy) with a horizontal structure of
independent sovereign states that each possessed equal and legitimate
authority. 213 "Control" threads through modem definitions of sovereignty,
both in terms of how authority is constituted within a sovereign nation and
whether outside forces have authority over the inner workings of a
sovereign nation.2 14
Three elements pervade textbook definitions of the contours of
sovereignty: First, states may freely determine their relations with other
states. Second, states may determine the character of their own institutions.
Third, states exercise control over the activities that occur within their
territory.215 With these parameters, all nations (hypothetically) respect "the
principle of sovereign equality" of all other nations. Thus, all nations are
(hypothetically) equally empowered to assert the privileges of sovereignty
within their boundaries. 216
When taken to an extreme-or when asserted by nations as a shield
against foreign impositions, including REDD+ and MMRV safeguardS217 states assert that these parameters are absolute. That is, states have total,
unlimited autonomy to determine their own relations, institutions, and

212. SIGRUN
SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL
BORDERS;
STATES'
OBLIGATIONS
IN
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 23-24 (2006).
213. See R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 144-45 (6th ed.

1984); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Characterof Sovereignty in International
Law and InternationalRelations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 148 n.26 (2004).
214. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 213, at 149-50 (noting that sovereign states have the
power to control their populations, and to represent those populations in the international arena);
Biersteker & Weber, supra note 202, at 2 (noting that the leaders of a sovereign, territorial state have
"ultimate political authority" within their domain).
215. French, supra note 12, at 378.
216. U.N. Charter art. 2, para.1; see also Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of
InternationalInstitutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34
NYU J. INT'L L & POLITICS 513, 513-14 (2002) (exploring the problematic underpinnings of
"sovereign equality").
217. Wilson, supra note 25, at 1021 ("[Sovereignty] is merely a concept that is used to
legitimize their objection. Arguing that the recommendations in this Article [for access to justice for
victims of offsetting] cannot be implemented because they infringe upon state sovereignty obfuscates
the political and economic reality surrounding developing states' unwillingness to risk a reduction in
foreign investment.").
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activities. 218 However, as Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) expresses it:
The doctrine that the sovereign is free to do whatever statute does
not expressly prohibit is a long-exploded doctrine. Such extreme
positivism in legal doctrine has led humanity to some of its worst
excesses. History has demonstrated that power, unrestrained by
principle, becomes power abused. Black-letter formulations have
their value, but by no stretch of the imagination can they
represent the totality of the law.219
Such complete independence has never occurred. Sovereignty has always
made room for cooperation and interdependence. 2 20 As Perrez points out,
cooperation is both a legal requirement and a constitutive element of
sovereignty.221 Even hegemonic states of the global North require
cooperation (and in turn must cooperate) to achieve their goals. Smaller
states, mostly in the global South, depend upon the good will and the
obligations imposed by international law to continue to function and
provide basic security and other needs for their citizens.22 2 Furthermore, the
legal principle that states are free to chart their own affairs has the
complimentary principle that states cannot then decide the internal affairs of
other states.223
International human rights law breaches the berm of absolute
sovereignty, imposing external limits on what power leaders can wield with
respect to their own citizens and institutions.224 Sovereignty has always
included a necessary element of cooperation; I advocate that sovereignty
should evolve to require increasing cooperation in a world that will need
interdependent solutions to environmental problems that threaten all the
traditional hallmarks of sovereignty.

218. See CHAYES, supra note 54, at 26-27; LORI F. DAMROSCH, Louis HENKIN, SEAN D.
MURPHY, & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (5th 2009); PERREZ, supra

note 195, at 3. See generally PERREZ, supra note 195, at 69-71 (providing a history of the concept of
"sovereignty as independence"); Royal C. Gardner, What is the Most Compelling Environmental Issue
Facing the World on the Brink of the Twenty-First Century? Respecting Sovereignty, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 133, 134-35 (1996).
219. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 494
(July 8) (Weearamantry, J., dissenting).
220. Marauhn, supra note 198, at 729-30; Javier Solana, Whose Sovereignty?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/conmentary/whose-sovereignty-.
221. PERREZ, supra note 195, at 247.
222. CHAYES, supra note 54, at 26-27.
223. See, e.g., PERREZ, supra note 195, at 134.
224. French, supra note 12, at 376; DAMROSCH, supra note 218, at 376; Anghie, supra note 216,
at 536-45.
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F. PermanentSovereignty Over NaturalResources
Sovereignty met international environmental law in the 1960s and
1970s when the international community established the legal principle of
"Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources" (PSNR). PSNR arose as
colonial powers divested power to new states seeking greater equity in the
international order.225 PSNR proposes that nations may do what they wish
with natural resources within their borders, as long as the use does not
interfere with other nations' abilities to use their natural resources; a
principle of fair and equitable resource sharing is implied.226 Numerous UN
General Assembly Resolutions proclaimed PSNR, summarized in Principle
21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which provides that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." 227
The Principle has been reaffirmed at UN-sponsored conferences in Rio and
225. See Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII),
pmbl., U.N. Doc. AIRES/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962); see also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note
156, at pmbl. 1 4, art. 3; United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed.,
June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declarationon the Human Environment, 21, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.48/14/Rev.
http://www.unep.org/
available at
Declaration],
Stockholm
[hereinafter
1
(1973)
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503; PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE,
& CATHERINE REDOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENvIRONMENT 191 (3d ed. 2009); Kamal
Hossain, Introduction to PERMANENT SOVERIEGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW: PRINCIPLE & PRACTICE ix (Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984); Nico J.
Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind, in
INT'L LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 87 (1988).

1, 5, U.N. Doc.
226. PERREZ, supra note 195, at 69-70 n. 1 (2000); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI),
A/RES/2158 (Nov. 28, 1966). Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration provides:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 225.
227. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 225, 21; see also G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1803 (Jan. 1, 1963) (noting that states have the right to permanent sovereignty over their
natural resources and wealth for the benefit of their national development and people); G.A. Res. 2158
(XXI), supra note 226, at 1 (reaffirming "the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources"); French, supra note 12, at 381 (arguing that the Stockholm

Declaration's "no harm" rule is the "most fundamental rule of modem international environmental law").
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Johannesburg, in the Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
and elsewhere.22 8 The UNFCCC reaffirms that States possess "the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and development policies," while linking that to the "no
harm" principle that such actions may not damage areas outside their
national jurisdiction. 22 9 The general contours of sovereignty pertain to the
legal idea as used in PSNR, as well.
Under the aegis of PSNR, some developing nations originally argued
for nationalization of resources, especially oil. 230 These nations now may
use PSNR to argue against environmental obligation to protect natural
resources under their exclusive sovereign control.23 1 Perrez notes that:
[A] typical argument against international obligations to
protect and preserve the environment and natural resources
is that such obligations are subterfuges designed to maintain
the economic dominance of the industrialized world, that
they are a new form of "eco-colonialism" or
''environmental imperialism," and that they impede the
state's control over its natural resources and thus violate the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural

resources. 2 32
In climate change negotiations, China and other nations wield claims of
sovereignty to buffer their objections on intrusive MMRV protections,
including protections for indigenous populations and third-party verifiers
for various parameters.2 33
Simply because forests fall within the bounds of a nation does not
necessarily put those forests beyond the reach of international
environmental law. Once intact forests are deemed essential to mitigating
GHG buildup, they inch closer to an international resource that states no
longer control. REDD+ moves to internationalize intact forests by making
228. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Jeneiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, $ 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1); Jutta Brunn6, Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 550, 565 (Bodansky et al. eds.,

2007).
229. UNFCCC pmbi., May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 169.
230. BIRNIEETAL., supra note 225, at 191; PERREZ, supranote 195, at 108.
231. PERREZ, supranote 195, at 108.
232. Id. at 95.
233. See e.g., Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 48; Leo Peskett & Maria Brockhaus,
When REDD+ Goes National: A Review of Realities, Opportunities and Challenges, in REALISING
REDD+: NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY OPTIONS 28 (Arild Angelsen ed., 2009).
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them fungible carbon storage devices, yet another object to trade, with deals
flying below the radar of national leaders. Once forests are internationalized
as part of efforts to mitigate global GHG buildups, the concomitant MMRV
regime further threatens the PSNR: The resource is no longer under the
exclusive control of the nation that ensconces it, and efforts to conserve that
resource include explicit intrusions into a nation's traditional sovereign
prerogatives. On the other hand, Southern nations are exercising traditional
sovereign prerogatives both to negotiate conservation of their own
resources in exchange for economic gains, and by using the leverage of
their forests to negotiate tit-for-tat MMRV regimes.
G. InternationalEnvironmentalLaw and the Challenge to Traditional
Sovereignty
Sovereignty has always existed in a tense space between the assertions
of independence and the exigencies of interdependence. International
environmental law pushes the goals of the latter, as environmental resources
and pollutants do not respect cartographic boundaries resulting from the
vagaries of history and the footprints of political expediency.
En route to their decision in the Nuclear Weapons Case,2 34 the judges
of the International Court of Justice state: "The Court recognizes that the
environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could
constitute a catastrophe for the environment." 235 The Court also recognizes
that the physical world must constrain international law, as "[t]he
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality
of life and the very health of human beings, including generations
unborn."236 The Court then affirms that sovereignty has its constraints, as
"the existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment." 2 37
234. The Court concluded (7-7 with the presiding judge offering the tiebreaking vote):
[T]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and
rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8).
235. Id. at 241.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 241-42.
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen notes that the freedoms
granted by sovereignty are limited when those freedoms impinge on other
nations' sovereign freedoms: 23 8 "International law does indeed concern
relations between sovereign States. However, as it has been remarked,
sovereignty does not mean that those relations are between billiard balls
which collide but do not cooperate. There is at work a process of cohesion-

building." 23 9 Explicitly,
[t]he framework shuts out the right of a State to embark on a
course of action which would dismantle the basis of the
framework by putting an end to civilization and annihilating
mankind. It is not that a State is prohibited from exercising a
right which, but for the prohibition, it would have; a State can
have no such right to begin with .... It is difficult for the Court
to uphold a proposition that, absent a prohibition, a State has a
right in law to act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of
all other States of meaning .... If it finds, as it should, that both
the Charter and the Statute posit the continued existence of
civilization and of mankind, it is difficult to see how it can avoid
a course of action which could ensure in the destruction of
civilization and the annihilation of mankind.240
I follow Judge Shahabuddeen in the legal and ethical perspective I take
on the boundaries of sovereignty. Sovereignty is constrained-and
reimagined-by the need to cooperate to fill international duties. States
have no graver duty than to avoid imperiling life on Earth, and have an
affirmative duty to mitigate any such threats. Sovereignty's borders are
porous; a country's liberties and duties are not unlimited even within
national boundaries, and affirmative duties do not stop at national
boundaries. States do not possess the right to act in ways that could destroy
the framework upon which such rights are based. Unfettered GHG
pollution-coupled with massive forest destruction-poses enormous
threats requiring that sovereignty must be re-imagined to avoid further
imperiling human and nonhuman communities today and into the future.
Human legal constructions-like "sovereignty"-ineluctably bend
before the physical reality of shared environmental resources and invading
pollution. Environmental resources often do not respect political

238. Id. at 393.
239. Id. at 425.
240. Id. at 393-94, 397.
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boundaries; pollution does not stop at border crossings.241 Thus, numerous
international courts have elaborated on the "no harm" rule, as international
environmental law increasingly imposes a limitation on absolute
sovereignty by imposing an obligation to prevent transboundary
pollution.24 2 This is widely seen as a principle of customary international
environmental law.243 The Preamble to the UNFCCC itself strikes this
sovereignty balance:
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in
international cooperation to address climate change. 24
According to French, "the unique features of environmental issues and
the challenge they pose to the international community mean that
international environmental law is actually affecting the very nature of
international law itself."245 To take this a step further: International
environmental law is affecting nature itself. Leaders and lawyers are
engaged in a complex dialectic between the rapidly changing natural world
and our legal constructs that facilitate manipulation, destruction, or
stewardship of the natural world. As other environmental threats have done
in the past, a rapidly changing climate leads us to change our legal notions
of the bedrock principle of sovereignty. The natural world itself will be
241. See Marauhn, supra note 198, at 730.; Michael J. Glennon, Has InternationalLaw Failed
the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT' L. 1, 30 (1990); Gardner, supra note 194, at 539-40 n.5.
242. See United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes art. 2, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269; PERREZ supra note 195, at 3, 124;
David Takacs, Water Sector Reforms and Principles of International Environmental Law, in WATER
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 260, 283 (Philippe Cullet et al. eds., 2010); Christoph Schwarte
& Ruth Byrne, Found. For Int'l Envtl. Law & Dev., International Climate Change Litigation and the
Negotiation
Process
7
(Oct.
2010)
(working
paper),
available
at
http://www.field.org.uk/files/FIELDcclit longOct.pdf; Trail Smelter; Lac Lanoux, Argentina/Uruguay
Pulp Mills, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, etc.
243. See Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2008 I.C.J.
301-302, 1 5.52 (July 29); SUMUDu A. ATAPATIU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 60-61 (2006); French, supra note 12, at 381; Schwarte & Byrne, supra note 242,
at 6.
244. UNFCCC, supra note 229, pmbl.
245. French, supra note 12, at 377.
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shaped by this legal principle.
Dan Tarlock laments that "[t]ransnational ecosystems are studied and
mapped more than they are protected because there is little formal
recognition of ecosystems as distinct objects of legal protection in
international law."246 Tarlock notes that "[t]here are few explicit treatybased ecosystem protection duties in international environmental law, likely
due to respect paid to national sovereignty." 247 Tarlock is looking for a
vision of sovereignty as flexible as the ecosystems that transcend national
borders. He opines:
Over time, ecosystem protection may also benefit from the efforts
of international environmental and human rights law to modify
the traditional concept of exclusive and unlimited national
territorial sovereignty ... modern conceptions of sovereign rights
could be modified by erga omnes duties to require more
sustainable use of national territories such as tropical rainforests
and wetland systems. The legal rationale is that the potential
adverse global impacts of ecosystem modification may make
them part of the common heritage of mankind or a matter of
248
common concern or common interest.
Similarly, greenhouse gas pollution knows no political boundaries, and
does not limit itself to territories adjacent to where the pollution is
emitted. 24 9 The atmosphere cannot be divided into discrete quanta to be
allocated to different nations. Ecological reality simply refuses to bow to
cartographers' or lawyers' wishes.250 While a certain amount of
transboundary environmental harm is legally acceptable (although how
much is not clear 25 ), we've reached an age where GHG pollution threatens
to fundamentally and irrevocably change human and nonhuman life as we
know it. However much transboundary harm is acceptable, we've passed
that threshold.

246. Dan

Tarlock,

Ecosystems,

in

THE

OXFORD

HANDBOOK

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 574, 576 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
247. Id. at 586.
248. Id. at 587.
249. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2008 I.C.J.
301-302, 5.52 (July 29).
250. Marauhn, supranote 198, at 730.
251. See French, supra note 12, at 386.
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C. Forests: Whose Sovereign Property?
But is the answer state-based, erga omnes obligations or other
international legal strictures that undermine PSNR by mandating that
nations must preserve their forests in the name of climate change mitigation
or biodiversity preservation? When forests exist within the boundary of a
nation, whose sovereign properties are they? Are forests part of the
common heritage of humankind, or are they locally bounded resources
whose fate is to be decided by national sovereigns or local people? National
leaders will assert that our traditional notion of sovereignty, buttressed by
the movement for PSNR, means that forests are simply the sovereign
property of the State, and the State is free to do with those forests what it
wishes.
But negotiations over REDD+-and over MMRV to make REDD+
projects possible-show that this common understanding is not always so
common. The emerging MMRV for REDD+ regime seeks a different route.
It finds multiple actors-both within and beyond forest nations-jockeying
for control of a resource whose resource-meaning is evolving, and whose
clear legal identity as a resource under exclusive sovereign control of a
nation state is eroding.
As they construct a legal regime around MMRV for REDD+, various
non-state parties are accruing power domestically and internationally,
undermining the traditional borders of "sovereignty." Global climate
change erodes state sovereignty as it threatens the ecological viability of a
nation's resources, threatens the livelihoods of citizens who depend upon
those resources, and undermines a nation's ability to steward resources for
its citizens' welfare. Efforts to cope with externally imposed ecological
change also drain resources from other goals an economically challenged,
sovereign nation may wish to pursue on behalf of its citizens.252 Climate
change may cause island states to disappear completely; 25 3 in the context of
REDD+, changing climates lead to changing ecological patterns to which
252. Bierrman & Dingwerth, supranote 210, at 5.
253. See Kristin Choo, Washed Away: As Sea Levels Rise, Island Nations Look to the Law to
Fend off Extinction, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/
washed away assea levels riseisland nations lookto the law ("If climate change advances the
way most scientists predict, the citizens of many of the world's small island nations may face a
catastrophe of mythic proportions sometime during this century."); Mark Limon, Human Rights and
Climate Change: Constructinga Case for PoliticalAction, 33 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 439, 455 (2009)
(examining how a human rights-based approach to climate change addresses the displacement of people
when their island nations are inundated). Entire conferences are dedicated to this proposition. See, e.g.,
Thousand Island Nations Conference Materials, Centerfor Climate Change Law, COLUMBIA LAW
School,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/threatened-island-nations/conferencematerials (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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forests may not be able to adapt. Heat, drought, and storms lead to more
254
frequent fires, storm destruction, pest invasion, and species extinction.
Disruptions in agricultural patterns may lead farmers to destroy more
forests than they otherwise would in a quest to survive. Sovereignty over
natural resources is not "permanent"-or even temporary-if forests
degrade or disappear due to changing ecological conditions.
PSNR arose to counter Northern control over former colonies' natural
resources; Southern nations now worry about diminished sovereignty if
Northern interests appropriate Southern forests as REDD+ carbon
repositories without adequate notification, due process, or compensation.
As a solution to global climate change (inter alia), REDD+ threatens to
further erode state sovereignty as manifold foreign and domestic actors
attempt to gain control of forests to achieve various cherished goals. As a
compliance device that ensures this dizzying array of actors in the REDD+
negotiations all fulfill their stated promises, MMRV may further erode
sovereignty in both South and North by allowing these actors to reach into
realms of domestic governance that were hitherto out of reach.
In the instant case, we see multiple actors, harmed in multiple ways by
GHG pollution and deforestation, making multiple MMRV demands of
multiple State and non-State actors. These voices from below and above the
State level in the REDD+ debates are all eroding the traditional sovereign
prerogatives of the State, with MMRV showing how mistrust necessitates a
system that rebuilds trust.
As the State recedes as the main focus and driver of international law,
it loses its hegemony to dictate what law is, and should be. Globalization
renders international law increasingly fragmented, multi-jurisdictional, nonhierarchical, and chaotic, undercutting the sacrosanct notion of state
sovereignty over internal regulation of resources, natural and otherwise.25 5
That is not a bad thing, if concerned citizens can steer the reins of a legally
pluralistic world towards a more deeply equitable world. 25 6 Traditional state
sovereignty may be undermined by the "new world order," described by
Slaughter as "a system of global governance that institutionalizes
cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their
peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve their
stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human
dignity." 2 57 According to Slaughter, "[w]e need more government on a
254.
255.
256.
options into
257.

Gillis, supra note 19 (detailing the devastation that is occurring from a warming climate).
Boyd, supra note 74, at 549.
See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 138, at 3 (expressing the author's goal of introducing "new
our current political imagination").
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004).
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global and regional scale, but we don't want the centralization of decisionmaking power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be
governed."2 5 8 MMRV for REDD+ may-if done well-present a
paradigmatic example of a synergistic, deeply equitable, transnational
democratic legal regime, a new emerging reciprocal contractual sovereignty
where the role of the State is to hold the legal reins to ensure that MMRV
rules get followed, and human and ecological communities are protected in
the rush to internationalize and commodify the world's forests as carbon
repositories.
Debates over forests are not just about what sovereign rights a national
government possesses vis-i-vis other nations. REDD+ proposals highlight
internal sovereignty struggles, notably legal wrangling between different
levels of government over who controls forests, and who can negotiate their
uses. REDD+ brings this into stark relief, as wealth will accrue to those
who successfully claim sovereignty over a given forest. While many
Southern nations have traditionally claimed that forests are the sovereign
property of the national government, in 2008, the governors of California,
Wisconsin, and Illinois signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the governors of four Brazilian states and two Indonesian provinces to
cooperate on REDD; this has been extended to additional subnational
governments in Mexico, Peru, and Nigeria.25 9 This MOU is the first
agreement that links REDD+ initiatives in developing countries to U.S.
greenhouse gas compliance laws and policies, and it was signed between
subnational government actors.
If REDD+ leads nations to relinquish sovereign control over forests to
subnational actors, devolution of law and policymaking from national to
subnational or local level may mean greater respect for local legal traditions
and community needs. Local people may have easier access to local
government officials, and may be better able to hold them accountable for
enforcing property law, thus potentially making for more stable and
equitable REDD+ investments. On the other hand, subnational government
leaders may also be more accessible to corporate or elite capture, or may
need or wish to raise more revenues through resource exploitation.260
Subnational governments may also be more buffered from international
customary law or treaty norms that have helped reform forest management

258. Id. at 8.
259. TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 23; GOVERNORS' CLIMATE & FOREST

TASKFORCE, supra note 30. Wisconsin has since withdrawn. Id.; see also About GCF, supranote 30.
260. Witness feuds in land use policy in the US between governors of western states and the
environmental policies of the federal government.
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and human rights, and which may be the target of MMRV demands.261
Project actors need to know that the government or community entity
with whom they're negotiating is actually the entity legally empowered to
own carbon property, broker deals, or issue carbon credits. Any actors
seeking to operate under subnational law must clarify the relationship
between national, subnational, and local layers of law; any system of
MMRV for social and economic protections will need to negotiate these
relationships as well. Are state or provincial governments able to negotiate
forest carbon-as-property legal rights and responsibilities absent national
government approval? Do these subnational entities have the capacity to
legislate, implement, and enforce forest carbon property laws and
contractual obligations? 262 When the central State no longer maintains legal
centrality, to whom do local people turn for redress if the MMRV contract
terms are broken? 263
For example, in large, forest-rich nations like Brazil or Indonesia,
where some power over forests devolves to state, provincial, or district
governments, forest carbon property legal rights and responsibilities of
central and peripheral governments are still not clearly delineated in law. In
Brazil, state Governors are entering into forest carbon deals, with benefits
to accrue to federally recognized indigenous groups. Despite legal analyses
suggesting that Brazilian law supports decentralized forest sovereignty, it is
not crystal clear who has the legal right to control and allocate forest
* resources, and formal land tenure is often unclear. 264 Similarly,
in
Indonesia, the national government, provincial governments, and traditional
adat communities struggle for sovereignty over forests. 2 65
MMRV regimes that seek safeguards for socio-economic and
biodiversity benefits will have to negotiate these internal sovereignty
struggles, and will end up shaping the contours of sovereignty in the
process. MMRV regimes' ground-truthing satellite data or policing

261. See CHRISTY ET AL., supranote 99, at 90-93; David Edmunds et al., Introductionto LOCAL
FOREST MANAGEMENT: THE IMPACTS OF DEVOLUTION POLICIES 3 (David Edmunds & Eva Wollenberg

eds., 2003); Anne M. Larson, Pablo Pacheco, Fabiano Toni, & Mario Vallejo, The Effects of Forestry
Decentralizationon Access to Livelihood Assets, 16(3) J. ENvT & DEV. 251, 252 (2007); SUNDERLIN ET
AL., supra note 23, at 22, 26.
262.

See TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 23.

263. See id; Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2000)
(identifying problems posed by the government increasingly using contracts to deliver public services).
264. See TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 35-38; Who Owns Carbon TradingRights
in the Amazon?, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/amazon/ (noting
that, although the Brazillian government owns Indian lands, the Sururi Indians have the right to use and
benefit from their land).
265. TAKACS, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16, at 49-51.
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governance reforms will similarly have to account for who has sovereignty
to control forests.
Indigenous peoples make their own sovereignty claims over forests.
MMRV regimes protecting social and economic benefits are partially
designed to protect these rights; all forms of MMRV must account for
whom, in fact, controls access to, and who benefits from the forest.266
Protection of indigenous and tribal peoples' ability to control their own
resources is a principle of both treaty law and of customary international
law. 2 67 The right of all "peoples" to "self determination"-that is, the right
to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development"-is the first right enshrined in the two
most prominent human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights. 26 8 The Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, ILO
Convention No. 169, Rio Agenda 21, and the United Nations Non-legally
Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests all require signatory nations to
protect traditional use of biological resources and traditional knowledge of
those resources.26 9 In 2007, the UN General Assembly passed a declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; while non-binding, the Declaration
266. See UN-REDD Programme, UN-REDD Programme Social and Environmental Principles
and Criteria, 8th Policy Bd. Mtg., March 25-26, 2012, at 5, U.N. Doc. UNREDD/PB8/2012/v/I (2012);
Raygorodetsky, supra note 18; MATT SOMMERVILLE, USAID, LAND TENURE AND REDD+: ISSUES
BRIEF
3-4 (2011), available at http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAIDLand
TenureLandTenure andREDD%2BIssue Brief 0.pdf, CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERSITY
ALLIANCE, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 20 nn.32-34, 25

(2d ed. 2008), available at https://s3.amazonaws.con/CCBA/Upload/ccb-standardssecondedition_
december_2008+%281%29.pdf.
267. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Jun. 27,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, pmbl., U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Russell
Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 829, 845 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
268. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1.1, Mar. 3, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, pt. I, art. 1.1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. at Art 1.1; see also DAVID HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM: DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 106 (2006) (noting that, under international law, "the word 'peoples' carries
legal connotations of self-determination, namely the right of peoples to determine the conditions under
which they live.").
269. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
supra note 268, arts. 7(1), 15(1) 16(1), 17(1), 17(2) (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 155, art. 8(j), 10(c); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
G.A. Res. 47/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/E/CN.17/1997/8, (Dec. 22, 1992); U.N. Secretariat, Non-legally
Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/62/L.5, Annex (Oct. 22, 2007)
(advising member states to manage forests with the approval and involvement of local communities, and
to enhance these communities' access to forest resources to support livelihoods); GRIFFITHS, supra note
25, at 16, 33 (noting that, under the Anchorage Convention on Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change,
all REDD initiatives should recognize and implement the rights of indigenous peoples).
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nonetheless recognizes that "Indigenous peoples have the right to the
conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity
of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and
implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such
conservation and protection, without discrimination."2 70 While this stops
short of saying that indigenous and tribal peoples have complete sovereign
control over their lands, it does bolster their case that REDD+ programs
should enhance and not hinder conservation of, and access to, traditional
indigenous lands. 2 7 1 Thus, sovereignty does not mean that State leaders are
entirely free to conduct their internal affairs as they wish; 2 72 in negotiating
REDD+ in general and REDD+ in particular, indigenous peoples advocate
for legal control of forests.
Southern nations that claim forests as their sovereign patrimony also
face challenges from external actors who would "internationalize" these
forests.273 Even prior to efforts to bring tropical forests into the international
climate regime (with attendant MMRV demands to make sure they stay
there), various scholars and activists claimed that forests (particularly
Southern, biodiversity-rich forests) were the "common concern" or
"common heritage" of humankind, and thus could not be exclusively
controlled by the nations in which they were found. Ecosystem services
arguments buttressing the need for REDD+ mean that the water-purifying,
soil-stabilizing, biodiversity-preserving, evolution-protecting character of
forests serve not just local or international populations, but the global good
that transcends national boundaries. Were arguments for forests as
"common heritage" to prevail, it would mean these forests are considered
the public trust of future generations-much as Antarctica, or the climate
are considered 2 74-and thus national sovereignty would be significantly
constrained. This legal concept has not been effectively applied to forests-

270. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 267, art. 29(1).
The United States, New Zealand, Australia and Canada voted against this resolution. See Declarationon
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES,
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsoflndigenousPeoples.aspx (last visited
Apr. 20, 2013).
271. Note also that the Convention on Biological Diversity does not refer to "rights" or
"peoples" and does not reaffirm the role that indigenous peoples play in biodiversity conservation. See
BIRNIE ET AL., supranote 225, at 627-28.
272. Anghie, supranote 217, at 536-37.
273.

See PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 495-96

(2003) (discussing the various International Tropical Timber Agreements).
274. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 43/53, pmbl., 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988) (observing
that the climate must be conserved and protected for the benefit of future generations).
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yet. 275
Southern nations' calls for the right to develop their natural resources
(whether sustainably or not) have long been in tension with any calls for
binding international conventions on forest protection, or for reconceiving
forests as a subject of "common concern."276 According to Birnie and
Boyle, to argue that ecological resources are the "common concern of
humankind ... places them on the international agenda and declares them
to be a legitimate object of international regulation and supervision, thus
overriding the domain of domestic jurisdiction."277 As Hunter expresses it,
the "story of international forest policy has largely been one of national
economic interests triumphing over international environmental issues, of
State sovereignty triumphing over common concern."278 To see forests as a
legal object of "common concern," according to French, would make
forests subject to the "emerging obligation on states to protect their own
environment" not only for their own people, but for the good of the global
whole. 2 79 REDD+-with apposite MMRV-could put this "emerging
obligation" under contractual terms, albeit with suitable financial aid to
enable success.
D. MMRVfor REDD+ as Multifurisdictional,MultipartyLegal Pluralism
William Boyd believes "our extraordinary ability to see and understand
global environmental problems such as climate change has facilitated an
unrealistic view that the path to solving such problems must lead to global
institutions capable of governing the Earth system in a comprehensive
manner." 280 And so we should move away from our unfortunate,
"unrealistic penchant for globalism in environmental law and
governance." 28 1 Furthermore, as distinct, disparate voices stand at various
rungs of (and away from) the traditional, formal legal hierarchy, even "[t]he
state now appears simply as one element . .. in multiple circuits of power,
connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within a whole variety of

275. See, e.g., Brunnie, Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern, supra note
225, at 563 ("[T]he common heritage concept has not found application beyond the LOSC and the Moon
Treaty.").
SALZMAN
&
276. DAVID
HUNTER,
JAMES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1145 (4th ed. 2011).

DURWOOD

ZAELKE,

INTERNATIONAL

277. Dan Tarlock, Ecosystems, supra note 246, at 588 n.29 (quoting P.W. BIRNIE ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 100 (2009)).
278. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 276, at 1145.

279. French, supra note 12, at 392.
280. Boyd, supra note 74, at 465.
281.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
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complex assemblages."282
The emergence of REDD+, coupled with MMRV strings to make it
functional, erode the State's control of forests; a dizzying array of non-State
actors foment private party contracts and externally imposed legal
standards. MMRV for REDD+ in many ways exemplifies the central
elements of "new governance," which Bradley Karkkainen explains "breaks
with fixity, state-centrism, hierarchy, excessive reliance on bureaucratic
expertise, and intrusive prescription" and instead is "more open-textured,
participatory, bottom-up,
consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible,
integrative, and pragmatic."2 83 Rather than the State as command and
control imposer of law, new governance substitutes "state orchestration" of
a complex legal program whose strictures and actors come from non-State
loci. As in REDD+ and the MMRV that enables it, the law derives from a
public-private partnership of forces within and outside the State; it is often
soft law (many of the standards come from norm entrepreneurs including
NGO consortiums or UN-affiliated organs) rather than "hard" mandatory
rules coming from national legislatures or leaders. 2 84 The State, if it stepped
up, would play traffic cop, attempting to regulate the various forces eyeing
the forest to ensure that its citizens-and the ecosystem services upon
which they depend-are, indeed, protected.285
But MMRV for REDD+ is not all new governance. As State control
erodes-as it "disaggregates, 2 86-numerous actors are struggling to fill
what Abbott & Snidal call an "orchestration deficit" 287 to control the
various MMRV procedures and thus control the resources MMRV seeks to
protect or promote. While disparate stakeholders seeking control over the
world's forest resources etch the parameters of MMRV for REDD+, the
result nonetheless intrusively prescribes a set of algorithms that require
bureaucratic expertise to calculate. The soft law of voluntary standards
eventually will or must harden as law.288 Karkkainen describes this hybrid
as a consensual (as opposed to top down) process that nonetheless leads to
282. ROSE, supra note 138, at 5.
283. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004).
284. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening InternationalRegulation Through
TransnationalNew Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 509, 520 (2009).
285. SLAUGHTER, supra note 257, at 8 ("This is the globalization paradox. We need more
government on a global and regional scale, but we don't want the centralization of decision-making
power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed.").
286. Id. at 31.
287. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 284, at 545.
288. See id. at 543 (explaining that some voluntary standards are soon embodied in legally
binding instruments).
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"fixed, definite, formal, ultimately coercive, enforceable and enforcedregulatory rules." 289
Describing "global legal pluralism," Paul Berman writes that "spheres
of complex overlapping legal authority are, not surprisingly, sites of
conflict and confusion," and advises we "create or preserve spaces for
productive interaction among multiple, overlapping legal systems by
developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to
manage, without eliminating, the legal pluralism we see around us." 2 90
Osofsky contends that "the nature of climate change regulation necessitates
multiscalar legal approaches .... Our demarcation of law into distinct
levels of governance and the overlapping sovereignty that accompanies it
make engagement of multiple scales simultaneously very challenging." 29 ' A
tit-for-tat MMRV for REDD+ seeks to manage-to make productive and
functional-these overlapping legal systems, operating at multiple scales.
The State need not disappear; it becomes a crucial actor holding some or all
of the oversight reins, ensuring that stakeholders respect the laws and fulfill
their legal responsibilities.
A bit of hybrid legal entropy can be a good thing if it enables effective
management of dwindling natural resources, and maximizes stakeholder
gains in a deeply equitable way. Boyd suggests that "it is clear that we need
a fresh vocabulary, an expanded set of concepts, alternative ways of
framing the challenges, but more importantly, new ways of understanding
the conditions of possibility for climate governance that build upon past
efforts without sliding back into the worn grooves of prior thinking." 2 92
Carlarne and Farber describe emerging "transnational environmental law"
as a "way of looking at environmental law as an interconnected and
interactive global network in response to interconnected, and often global,
challenges."293 It extends beyond the traditional purview of international
environmental law (comprised of treaties, customary and general principles
of international law, and the work of juristS29 4) to include domestic
legislation that has influence across national boundaries and (as in the
289. Karkkainen, supra note 283, at 487.
290. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 9-10 (2012).
291. Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?Litigation's DiagonalRegulatory
Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 587, 589-90 (2009).
292. Boyd, supra note 74, at 466.
293. Cinnamon Carlarne & Daniel Farber, Law Beyond Borders: TransnationalResponses to
Global Environmental Issues, I TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 13, 13 (2012).
294. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER-II (requiring the ICJ to
apply international conventions, prior judicial decisions, and international custom when deciding
disputes).
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instant case) private standards that operate at multiple levels.2 95
How does globalization's "plural, fragmented legal order" manifest
itself tangibly? 296 Yang and Percival describe an increasingly "global
environmental law" where international environmental legal regimes (A la
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol) increasingly intertwine with domestic,
subnational, and local regulation.2 97 The norms are not merely legal
"transplants," where nations (particularly in the South) adapt pre-existing
legal norms (particularly from the North) to jumpstart their own
underdeveloped legal systems.298 Instead, Yang and Percival describe
"harmonization" efforts to mutually standardize particular norms for crossborder parallel regulatory regimes, particularly to cope with parallel
environmental stressors. 29 9 Global environmental law, thus, is a "communal
endeavor" that does "not remain the responsibility, or sovereign
prerogative, of individual national legal systems or the specialized province
of international lawyers and diplomats." 30 0 As a result, we see in the rush to
REDD+ and negotiations for rules to facilitate it, certain "legal principles
have become part of the global commons" and thus "are at home
everywhere."o30
Can this unruliness in the global legal order nonetheless effectively and
equitably staunch huge problems such as climate change and deforestation?
Nikolas Rose calls for "investigations of government [that].. .try to track
force relations at the molecular level, as they flow through a multitude of
human technologies, in all the practices, arenas and spaces where
programmes for the administration of others intersect with techniques for
the administration of ourselves."3 0 2 MMRV (particularly for REDD+) is,
potentially a way forward-both towards governing and harmonizing
messy, disparate variables and actors who seek to measure and control
those variables, but also for tracking and modeling a reciprocal,
multijurisdictional, pluralistic environmental governance. On one hand,
MMRV for REDD+ is an essential element of any successor to the Kyoto
Protocol-the kind of overarching, overweening global institution that
295. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 122, at 32-34.
296. Boyd, supra note 74, at 498.
297. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36
ECOLOGY L. Q. 615, 616 (2009).
298. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 29-30

(2d. ed. 1993) (noting that legal "transplants"-that is, when "an entire legal system or a large portion of
it is moved into a new sphere"-occur when people move into new territories, or when they adopt the
large part of another peoples' system).
299. Yang & Percival, supranote 297, at 627.
300. Id. at 653.
301. Id at 664.
302. ROSE, supranote 138, at 5.
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Boyd and otherS303 Suggest we might discourage, lest it overly discourage
us and lead us down fruitless pathways that neither mitigate GHG buildup
nor protect forests. If there is to be a grand multilateral successor to the
Kyoto Protocol, both REDD+ and the MMRV that permits it, will be
prominently featured. No global, unifying treaty to mitigate climate change
will occur without REDD+ or without MMRV.
Gus Speth notes that major international agreements on climate and
biodiversity have done little to help climate or biodiversity, and forests have
eluded such agreements; treaty goals are largely aspirational, and "not
followed by clear requirements, targets, and timetables." 304 Thus even if the
fusty, UNFCCC, 190+ nation, and potentially moribund Grand Guignol
process is put out of its misery, REDD+ will continue to be one of the new
and messy legal architectures for coordinating multi-stakeholder efforts
across multiple jurisdictions. 305 This architecture includes rules to govern
bilateral REDD+ deals, with significant private sector participation.30 6
REDD+-with apt MMRV-if done correctly, builds on the "worn
grooves of prior thinking." 307 Previous efforts to curb deforestation have
scarcely worked; traditional models of development, even with the
"sustainable" moniker, often fail.30 s MMRV for REDD+ arises, in part, as
an alternative to such actions-to build something new that could possibly
work for synergistic benefits. The REDD+ participants seek to fulfill
cherished goals whose loci lie in the world's imperiled forests; MMRV
maximizes all parties' goals. Reciprocal MMRV for REDD+ balances
control in multiple, disparate stakeholders' hands. Mutualistic MMRV is
necessary not just for Green Fund or other Northern financing of Southern
REDD+ as part of a UN global climate change treaty; it may govern any
303.

See, e.g., JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 95-97 (2004) (arguing that progress under the Kyoto Protocol is "too little
and too slow").
304. Id. at 97.
305. See Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention,
UNITED

NATIONS

FRAMEWORK

CONVENTION

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php (explaining that the Ad Hoc Working Group was established "to
conduct a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the
Convention.") (last visited Apr. 20, 2013); Alliance of Small IslandStates Leaders' Declaration,2012,
AOSIS.ORG, http://aosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2012-AOSIS-Leaders-Declaration.pdf (expressing
concern that climate change threatens its members' "territorial integrity, viability and survival") (last
visited Apr. 20, 2013).
306.

See PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 108-09 (2012); DAVID DIAZ ET

AL., STATE OF FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2011, at 13 (2011) (providing an overview of private market
participation in REDD+); Volcovici, supra note 18 (noting that a handful of financial institutions are
working with NGOs to invest in REDD+ projects).
307. Boyd, supra note 74, at 466.
308. Speth, supranote 303, at 96.
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kind of deeply equitable system that both treats forest carbon as a fungible
asset in the global value chain but also treats human dignity and species
survival as objects of global-and local-concern. States qua states are
only part of the answer-maintaining their pivotal role in formal
international law, acting as orchestrators in a legally pluralistic system of
ever expanding layers of norms and actors, and intersecting to forge
regulation that might overcome global mistrust in time to save some robust
remnants of a gorgeous planet.
E. ParadigmPower Struggles, Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities,and Sovereign Equality
Dueling MMRV rhetoric underscores the different paradigms in which
Northern and Southern nations operate as they consider climate change and
the aid that Northern nations proffer to help Southern nations adapt. The
aspects of those paradigms that prevail help define the responsibilities
sovereignty requires in this century. MMRV for REDD+ moves towards
compromise between seemingly incommensurate paradigms.
Countries (or subnational entities) incur considerable expense fulfilling
objectives of multilateral environmental treaties-or implementing their
own domestic environmental laws. Environmental protection doesn't come
cheap, particularly for developing nations that face opportunity costs when
they prioritize long-term environmental sustainability over short-term
resource development. 0
All aspects of MMRV, in particular, may be expensive.310 A survey of
ninety nine developing nations found that only China, India, and Mexico
had the MMRV resources necessary to monitor forests comprehensively.31 1
More demanding MMRV procedures-satellite monitoring, forest patrols,
biodiversity surveying, stakeholder participation, grievance procedures,
comprehensive legal reform, governance housecleaning-require more
technical equipment, more training, and/or more hours of expert time. 312

309. See WAGGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 44 (noting that the sellers of forest resources face
significant transaction costs).
310. See, e.g., BREIDENICH & BODANSKY, supra note 38, at 12 (acknowledging that the
implementation of MMRV is resource-intensive); Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 47 (noting
that measuring, reporting, and verifying of emissions reductions must be done through a "rigorous,
robust, and transparent" system).
311. MARTIN HEROLD, AN ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL FOREST MONITORING CAPABILITIES IN
TROPICAL NON-ANNEX 1 COUNTRIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING 27-28 (2009),
available at http://princes.3cdn.net/8453cl798ld0ae3cc8_q0m6vsqxd.pdf.
312. See Wettestad, Monitoring and Verification, supra note 71, at 994 (noting that high
verification costs are apparent in trading systems in the United States and United Kingdom); REDDNET, supranote 120, at 3 (noting that recent estimates put monitoring and capacity-building costs at $2
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Furthermore, a thin line separates facilitating compliance through
cooperation (with technical and financial aid to assist compliance) and
demanding compliance through a more rigorous and even punitive
system-which would increase the costs."' Thus, developing nations
demand financial assistance if they are to implement robust MMRV
systems, with advocacy groups supporting these demands.3 14 Indeed, some
portion of the billions of dollars pledged for fast track and long-term
climate assistance would go towards "REDD+ Readiness," including
building a transparent system of MMRV.3 15
Northern nations, however, are asking for a guaranteed return on their
REDD+ investments-even though they have been primarily responsible
for creating the problems that necessitate MMRV. Benito Miller of the
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies discusses the two purposes of climate
change aid. Northern leaders see climate change aid as standard, official
development assistance (ODA): No legal obligation requires giving this aid,
and no recipient is legally entitled to receive such aid.316 Southern leaders,
on the other hand, see climate change aid as restitution, that is, as payment
to help nations adapt to the harmful impacts of climate change, which have
been caused by the North. They believe that both restorative justice and
international law oblige Northern nations to defray the costs of
environmental harms that they have caused, are causing, and most
ominously, will cause."'
International law scholars may be forgiven for reacting skeptically
when the term "emerging obligation" is applied to any legal responsibility,
and for thinking that such a term may say more about the author's
normative desires than any actual reality.
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) may (or may not)
be an emerging principle of customary international environmental law,31 8
to $25 per kilometer of forest; $10,000 to $30,000 per month for expert support; and $100,000 to
$140,000 per year for training).
313. Niederberger & Kimble, supra note 51, at 47-48.
314. SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 2.
315. Tim Boyle & Josep Gari, Supporting REDD+ Readiness in UN-REDD PartnerCountries,
UN-REDD PROGRAMME, available at http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter9_Support topartner
countries/tabid/4670/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
316. Miller, supranote 131, at 2.
317. Id.; WINKLER ET AL., supra note 197, at 7. This paper avoids discussing formal legal state
responsibility for the harms they have caused through fomenting climate change. See Sinden, supranote
132, and Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985, 994-996, 1001 (2012), for an
extensive discussion on how one might conceptualize and calculate such damage remedies. But see id at
1001 ("If climate change results in a drastic global threat to society, increasing the rate of savings is not
likely to be a workable form of compensation to future generations.").
318. See ATAPATru, supra note 243, at 424 (contending that CBDR is not yet a customary
principle, and has no application outside of express language in various MEAs); CULLET, supra note 25,
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but certainly is the foundational legal and ethical principle under
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, and prevailed in the Cancun agreements. 3 19 (It
may, however, have met an untimely demise in Durban. 32 0)
As described in the UNFCCC's Art. 3(1):
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.321
CBDR would require that all nations mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
contribute to adaptation efforts, but requires more significant contributions
from Northern nations.322 The climate change conventions' legal
requirements combine pragmatism with ethics. Pragmatically, some
nations, predominantly in the global North, have greater financial resources
to mitigate GHG buildup and help other nations adapt; those nations gained
these resources from industrial development whose excesses continue to
pollute the global atmospheric commons. Thus the North bears the primary
responsibility to reduce emissions and help the South adapt to the pollution
.32
the North has emitted en route to economic prosperity.323 So, for example, a
at 88-89 (contending that CBDR is not now, but may soon be, a customary principle); Ulrich Beyerlin,
Policies,Principles,and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

425, 442 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that CBDR is not a part of today's customary
international law, because states have been ambivalent about adopting it as such); Christopher D. Stone,
Common But DifferentiatedResponsibilities in InternationalLaw, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 276 (2004)
(noting that CBDR is receiving increased attention in international law); Takacs, A Deep Equity Legal
Analysis, supra note 13, at 538-41 (noting that CBDR is an emerging principle of international law).
319. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 229, pmbl., ("[T]he global nature of climate change calls
for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, in accordance with their Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and
respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.").
320. Cara Horowitz, The Durban Outcome: End of CBDR?, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (Dec. 13,
2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/the-durban-outcome-end-of-cbdr/#more-12846.
321. UNFCCC, supra note 229, art. 3(1); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 108, art. 10(c)
(imposing obligations on the parties based on CBDR); Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and
Limits of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime, 16 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 81, 93 (Ole Kristian
Fauchald et al. eds., 2007) (noting that both Kyoto and the UNFCCC have "as their ethical anchor the
principle of Common but Differentiated responsibilities").
322. CULLET, supranote 25, at 87.
323. See Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the
Forestry Sector: Conceptual and OperationalFallacies, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 102-03
(1997) (noting the calls "for developed countries to take the lead in solving existing global
environmental problems, on the basis of different historical (and present) contributions of developed and
developing countries to the creation of these problems."); Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But
Diferentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Change Regime - Amending the Kyoto Protocol to
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group of experts from Brazil, South Africa, India, and China assert the
"overoccupation of the atmosphere by Annex-i countries GHG emissions"
should lead to a "sustainable future with equity." To compensate for their
impermissible "overuse of carbon space," developed countries must
dramatically reduce their GHG emissions to allow for sustainable (and,
regrettably, carbon emitting) development in developing countries.324
To the extent that CBDR remains an explicit plank of climate change
legal agreements, a principle of customary international environmental law,
or a moral norm guiding stakeholder behavior in explicit or implicit ways, it
buttresses the requirement for a two-tiered MMRV system: If Northern
nations are subject to stricter MMRV, it is because of the normative basis
underlying CBDR-they created the problem in the first place and thus
should face heavier compliance responsibilities. If Southern nations must
take action based upon their "common" responsibilities, those actions
should prove less onerous, and be subject to MMRV only if they receive aid
to conduct the necessary and expensive MMRV measures.325 By their
willingness to foot the MMRV bill, Northern nations are, at least, assuming
enhanced responsibilities towards mitigating a shared problem.
CBDR remains controversial, particularly in the U.S. and Canada,
where the age of "differentiated" is over (if it ever existed), and we are now
in the age of "common." 32 6 U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd
Stem finds "no textual support" for the idea that in the climate change
regime, "developed countries have legally binding obligations while
developing countries are asked only to act voluntarily." 32 7 Stern continues,
"the old 'Kyoto' paradigm is wrong as a matter of textual exegesis. But,
more important, this paradigm is unworkable as a matter of both substance
and politics." 3 28 The U.S. thus refuses to act unilaterally or with its
developed world allies; the South must be included in provisions exacting
mandatory GHG reductions.329
In 2010, leading up to the Cancun negotiations, Stem explicitly tied the
Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 254
(2007) (asserting that "it is not equitable for developing countries to equally share the burden of
controlling GHG emissions when, until recently, developed countries have done most of the polluting");
Rajamani, supra note 321, at 89, 93 (noting the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol's recognition of
different "responsibilities" and "obligations" of developing versus developed countries).
324. WINKLER ETAL., supra note 197, at 6, 19.
325. This is the framework emerging from the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements.
326. See Bodansky, supra note 45, at 240 (noting the shift in breaking "the so-called firewall
between developed and developing countries").
327. Stem, supra note 119.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Goldenburg, supra note 52 (noting America's all or nothing position on climate
change).
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$100 billion per year pledged by developed countries to the new Green
Fund to both explicit mitigation commitments from the South, and to
"transparency"-operationalized in a strict MMRV agreement. 33 0 Stern
stressed emphatically that this aid does not fall under the aegis of CBDR.33 1
In Durban in 2011, Canada took up the charge to rid the climate change
agreements of any whiff of CBDR. Canada's Environmental Minister Peter
Kent insisted that:
Emerging and developing countries need to stop "wielding the
historical guilty card" and asking for a free pass on emissions
reductions just because in the past, industrialized countries had
more emissions than the rest of the world .. .. There is a fairly

widely held perception in the developing world of the need for
guilt payment to be built into any international deal on climate.332
Some in the North believe that the South is using MMRV demands as a
way to have issues decided in their favor.333 They see rapidly developing
Southern nations like China and India as carbon polluters who should not
be profiting from Northern aid while they, too, contribute to climate change
without having to take legally binding steps to address their own
burgeoning carbon emissions. U.S. and Canadian diplomats see climate
change aid as a form of charity, part of a beneficent commitment to provide
ODA. As voluntary aid givers, Northern nations get to set the terms of the
aid. A rigorous MMRV is part of those terms, ensuring that nations in the
South do what they pledge to do-and ensures Northern legislators and
citizens that their money is not going up in smoke.334 As such, the shift
away from CBDR further buttresses U.S. and allies' claims for MMRV for
GHG reductions, forest cover change, and governance: If Northern nations
are not required to provide climate change aid by any legal or political
exigencies, then those nations are freer to attach MMRV strings to whatever
aid they do choose to give out of the goodness of their collective hearts.
330. Stem, supra note 119.
331. Id; United States Announces $1 Billion to Reduce Forest Emissions, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
2009),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2009/12/
16,
(Dec.
0618.xml&printable-true&contentidonly=true; Goldenburg, supra note 52.
332. Rhead Enion, Fossil of the Day: Canada Takes a Commanding Lead, LEGAL PLANET
BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/12606/. A group of NGOs awarded a
daily "Fossil of the day" at Durban "for the country doing its best to impede, stall or otherwise oppose
progress in climate negotiations." Canada won the overall competition, with the United States finishing
a close second.
333. Stem, supranote 119.
334. See Ward, supra note 6, at I (describing the role of the United States in shaping the
language of the Bali Action Plan).
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While the North speaks the language of charity, the South sees pledged
aid as repayment on a debt, as a form of restitution and reparation.
Climate change will disproportionately harm the South, and
disproportionately harm the poorest of the poor in the South-that is,
climate change will most harm those who did least to create the problem. 336
Thus for many in the global South, to discuss climate change is to discuss
global injustice.33 ' To view the MMRV debate through a Southern lens
means seeing that Northern citizens have used the atmosphere as a carbon
dump for the byproducts of industrial excess generated as they gluttonously
overconsume the Earth's resources; as a consequence, Northern citizens
have become wealthy without paying for the damaging externalities of their
development. If we view the atmosphere as a divisible carbon dump, the
U.S. and other Northern nations exceed their entitlement, and Southern
nations do not come close to their entitlement.33 8
Thus both distributive justice (fair allocation of burdens and benefits of
ecological pollution and amenities) and corrective justice (fair
compensation for the harms of past, present, and future pollution) demand
restitution, and provide Southern nations the ethical bases for their MMRV
demands. 33 9 Embodied in the principle of CBDR, this is the factual and
ethical underpinning for their MMRV demands that financial contributions
be generous, transparent and genuinely additional, and that these donations
and GHG emissions reduction pledges be aggressive and subject to MMRV
scrutiny. Were the United States to pay its "carbon debt" to the developing
world at the European Union's emissions trading prices, as China and

335. See, e.g., Bodansky, supranote 45, at 237 (explaining that developing countries regard the
financial assistance as payment of a "carbon debt" that they owe for their emissions). For a thorough
treatment of climate reparations, see Burkett, supranote 5, at 521-36.
336. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (noting the vulnerability of the poor
to "climate shocks" and that "climate disasters are heavily concentrated in poor countries"); VERHEYEN,
supra note 5, at 34 (explaining that "[d]eveloping economies rely more heavily on climate-sensitive
activities" and will be affected by climate change "more severely"); Nelson, supra note 5, at 615-16,
619 (noting that African countries and other "less developed areas" will feel a "disproportionate share of
[the] side effects of industrialization"); Revkin, supra note 5 (noting the "growing climate divide"
between wealthy and poor nations); MACE, supra note 5, at I (explaining that countries with "the least
historical responsibility for GHG emissions now find themselves the most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change").
337. See, e.g., Sinden, supranote 132, at 296 ("The developed world is speaking the language of
economics, while the developing world speaks the language of justice."); WINKLER ET AL., supra note
197, at 9 (explaining that parties should protect the climate system in order to benefit inter-generational
justice).
338. Sinden, supranote 132, at 297, 343.
339. Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 78-79.
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Bolivia have asked, the United States would pay around $100 billion, or
about 1%of its GDP.340
The potential emerging consensus around REDD+, and the MMRV
that enables it nudges the paradigm somewhere towards the center of the
axis, away from the poles of charity and restitution. MMRV for REDD+
helps level an unequal playing field. Although "sovereign equality" of
nations is a fundamental principle of international law, Southern nations
have depended on Northern largesse, subordinated in many ways to the
hegemonic economic and political power of the North. Former colonies
have long had trouble breaking free from their colonial masters, their land
still marshaled by Northern forces for export crops, minerals, and other
commodities, their budgets dependent upon foreign aid and the strings
attached to that aid. Past "aid" proffered by the World Bank and other
Northern-dominated institutions have come with controlling, sometimes
harsh strings attached. 34 1 Their sovereign ability both to conduct internal
affairs robustly and to conduct relations with foreign states freely has thus
long been impaired, and "sovereign equality" of North and South nations
has remained elusive. Ecological disruptions wrought by climate change
lead to social disruptions, further undermining Southern nations' ability to
conduct their internal affairs as effectively as Northern nations can.
Forests help bring the international legal myth of "sovereign equality"
among nations closer to reality. In this global climate change century, trees
give the South a new bargaining chip to move towards sovereign equality.
The planet's vast, gorgeous tropical forests are not only the planet's lungs
and cradle of biological splendor, but also an alluring resource that holds
the key to overcoming the crisis of mistrust that pervades international law.
We all need repositories for newly problematic excess greenhouse gases,
and thus Southern nations have what Northerners want: Lush forests that
may disappear tomorrow and former forests that could once again rise. A
small but vigorous subset of concerned Northerners have long prized
Southern forests for the biodiversity they contain and the role they serve in
sustaining Southern livelihoods and sheltering endangered indigenous
peoples. But resources are not similarly prized; they may become so
through the machinations of international law. For Northern entities
suddenly compelled by conscience or law to seek cost-efficient repositories
340. Sinden, supra note 132, at 297, 343. The Stem Review set a "social cost" of carbon of
$85/metric ton, which would require 3% of US GDP. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE

CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 322 (2006). See also Bodansky, supra note 45, at 237 (noting that the
Copenhagen Accord creates a collective commitment of $30 billion between 2010-2012, and sets a
collective goal of$100 billion per year by 2020).
341. Anghie, supranote 216, at 629; Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 79.
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for their industrial carbon pollution, the South's forests become an even
more alluring, economically valuable resource.
REDD+ can exacerbate, or pose a way out of, the morass of dueling
actors with conflicting agendas. REDD+, with apposite MMRV, allows the
South to maintain some vestiges of their magnificent forests, and thus
provide ecological resiliency to help local communities adapt to climate
change. Southern nations are better able both to preserve these forests and
to acquire funds that allow them to pursue ecological and sustainable social
development (and not to have to divert funds to deal with the social
exigencies of changing ecosystems). We see also in MMRV negotiations
that Southern nations are not merely kowtowing to the conditionalities
imposed by Northern donors, but are countering demands in a reciprocal
MMRV regime. In its forests, the South has what the North wants; as this
resource becomes ever more prized, we move ever closer to the reality of
sovereign equality.
The developing world's forests, perhaps the most valuable resource for
their countries' development-and their most precious bargaining chipallow them to meet the demands for "common" contributions to solving the
climate change crisis, provided they submit to the requisite MMRV
regime.342 By pledging reductions in deforestation and forest degradation,
developing nations can make meaningful contributions to curbing climate
change and fulfill the developed nations' growing demands for "common"
responsibility for addressing the climate change crisis. By pledging aid to
help developing nations preserve their forests, pledging further reductions
in GHG emissions, and agreeing to the MMRV terms for both, developed
nations meet their "common" responsibility as well.
The
MMRV-attached
strings
discussed
above
blur
the
charity/restitution paradigms. The donors still make intrusive MMRV
demands, and the recipients agree to meet some of those demands; but the
recipients make their own demands, to which the donors are likely to
acquiesce. Forests are the pivot, and reciprocal MMRV the price all nations
will pay to achieve the mutually beneficial goals REDD+ promises. Forests
allow the "common" in CBDR, financial and technology transfer make
sovereign equality more real, and mitigated climate change makes long
term sovereignty over natural resources more possible.

342. Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law, supranote 77, at 872, 877.
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F. MMR V and the Questfor Quantifiability

In the past decade or so, forests have acquired new roles in
international law: They have become carbon repositories, with legal
structures rapidly developing to regulate this new identity for an old
entity.3 43 Climate change activists and Northern business interests-looking
for a cheap way to offset their required GHG emissions reductions that their
domestic legal regimes impose, or looking to capitalize on the offsetting
business 34-have promoted this new vision of trees as carbon storage units.
Forests thus house a measurable, fungible commodity suitable for trading
on international financial markets.34 5 Cherished anew as receptacles for
industrial carbon, this effort to repurpose forests is abetted by
conservationists who see in this new quantification regime their best hope
of massive conservation financing, and pro-poor advocates who eye the
prospect of billions of dollars of cash transfer from North to South, and by
all stakeholders who see in REDD+ a way to promote long term ecological
sustainability by realizing new value from intact forests.346
To quantify is to more easily govern and control. 347 As Nikolas Rose
expresses it, numbers "actually constitute the domains they appear to
represent; they render them representable in a docile form." 4 To turn
complex phenomena into numbers means attempting to depoliticize (and
thus more easily control) complicated political decisions. Particularly where
a crisis of "mistrust" exists, the "allure of numbers increases": "Expert"
professionals "justify their judgments on the grounds of objectivity," and
frequently situate "this objectivity in numerical form." 349 By transforming
trees into abstruse calculations about past, present, and future tons of carbon
a storage unit may deliver through contractual schemes, various actors seek
to control the fate of tropical forests. Seen through one lens, a tree is a mass
of tons of carbon, and MRV helps a set of (often) extraterritorial
"experts" measure those tons, monitor their changing volumes, report those
tons in a uniform way, and verify the results.
343. See generally TAKAcs, FOREST CARBON, supra note 16 (discussing several nations' efforts
to define forest carbon property rights).
344. Takacs, CarbonInto Gold,supra note 26, at 87.
345. Boyd, Ways ofSeeing in EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 77, at 856.
346. For example, there is a diverse coalition of forces underwriting the CCBA standards. See
Takacs, Carbon Into Gold, supra note 26, at 87 ("The legal principles we need-preventative, polluter
pays, environmental democracy and a host of environmental human rights, CBDR--are there, as are
some strong codes of voluntary standards that provide a starting point for formal lawmaking.").
347. ROSE, supra note 138, at 197 ("Numbers have achieved an unmistakable political
power.. [.]").

348. Id. at 198.
349. Id. at 208.
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William Boyd writes that "the very act of rendering something
objective and calculable is a way of making it technical, thereby taking it
out of the world of politics and social institutions.""o But with REDD+, the
worlds of politics and social institutions are pushing back. Although some
interested participants object to this new vision of forests as quantified
carbon storage devices,"' others are hopping on the quantification
bandwagon, with a twist. Forests are a kaleidoscopic resource for a swirling
mass of interests, each hoping to make their own cherished object-the
gene pool available for evolution, the secure land tenure that supports
indigenous people, the corruption of mid-level bureaucrats, the dollars
flowing from financial capitals, the smoke rising from burning fossil fuel to
make electricity-an equally quantifiable, compliance-able commodity
capable of external uniform comparison. If quantification facilitates control,
the interested parties doing the quantifying hope to be the experts
controlling the cherished resource. Sometimes these experts are exerting
control from afar, even if a few short years ago they had no authority or
claim to control the resource. Sometimes those claiming expertise are quite
close-the subnational governmental entities negotiating REDD+
cooperation with California, local communities looking for MMRV-related
employment, or indigenous people asserting rights over their traditional
lands. All see a route to controlling forests through proclaiming new
categories that can be quantified and thus MMRVed, composing the
MMRV criteria, designing the MMRV regime, and conducting the MMRV
procedures.
In the MMRV debates, we see a drive to render everything as objective
and calculable units, to convert messy social institutions and decisions into
technical calculations. Various MMRV demands shine a light back on these
social and political institutions, but do it by inverting the social into the
technical, by converting the political into a spreadsheet of calculations.
Diverse bundles of elements can be divvied up, quantified, scaled,
calculated, made more of or less of-can be MMRVed-and thus subjected
to competing power plays over who will control the objects of calculation.
Rendered more docile through quantification, the resource can potentially
be more easily governed, more capable of legal control from authorities
within and without a nation's traditional sovereign borders. But now many
stakeholders are jockeying for control of REDD+; once the resource is
quantifiable, fractious parties will jockey for control of the MMRV reins.

350. Boyd, Ways of Seeing in EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 77, at 910.
351. See sources cited supranote 26.
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If the MMRV regime is balanced and reciprocal, an increasing and
diverse array of players can meet their cherished goals vis-A-vis (and
favorable for) the world's forests and climate. A stable and sustainable
MMRV regime would balance control among stakeholders who will get
what they cherish from the world's forests. The parties that master the
quantification regime may challenge the traditional role of the state in
maintaining sovereign control over a nation's forests. Quantification makes
reciprocal, contractual sovereignty possible.
G. Reciprocal ContractSovereignty
REDD+ amounts to an alchemy that separates the carbon from the
trees, the trees from the forests, and the forests from the nation states where
those forests grow. Trees become carbon storage repositories, and
international legal regimes emerge to regulate who may own what quanta of
these repositories. As William Boyd puts it:
By de-coupling forest carbon from the forest ecosystem,
REDD de-couples territory and accountability from their
traditional instantiations in the state. Understanding what is
gained and what is lost in this process with respect to
existing practices of forest use and governance will require
moving beyond the predominantly technical focus on
carbon accounting and MRV that dominates much of the
contemporary REDD policy discussion.3 52
Here, though, the MMRV discussion is the discussion of multiple,
mutual accountabilities, facilitated through the quantification of multiple
variables. MMRV may decouple accountability from state control, but it
also may decentralize and democratize-or not, depending on how the
MMRV regime is structured; how quid pro quo it is; how the MMRV
regime measures and protects local rights and economic and noneconomic
values; whether or not local people derive expertise and economic benefit
not just from carbon offsets but from MMRV-based employment; and a
host of other parameters an MMRV regime will have to negotiate.
Southern nations that accept the legal limits MMRV for REDD+ places
on their sovereignty also assert a corollary that poor nations, possessing
biological resources that are of "common concern," requireNorthern aid to

352. Boyd, supranote 74, at 543-44.
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fulfill those legal responsibilities." It's tit-for-tat, and MMRV spells out
the reciprocal duties where all sides limit their sovereign rights. With
REDD+ and MMRV, Southern nations who wish to protect their own
environment-and cooperate in protecting the planet from transboundary
ecological disaster-find both a legal mechanism and a revenue stream. The
attendant contractual obligations may or may not necessarily flow from a
customary principle of international law, but they do attain status as
consideration in a consensual bargained-for exchange. Nonetheless, what
emerges is an obligation of an aid-receiving State, province, or community
to protect its own environment and its own people-with an attendant
obligation of a GHG-polluting State to reimburse the receiving State for
opportunity costs incurred as it restricts its sovereignty-while
simultaneously taking on the responsibility to reduce its own GHG
pollution, the impacts of which further weaken and threaten the Southern
nation's forests, and thus its sovereign control over its resources.
The Convention on Biological Diversity presages this. The Convention
stresses that conservation is a common concern, but reinforces PSNR, and
does not have intrusive provisions on biodiversity, per se, as an object of
common concern. 35 4 The Convention promotes access to genetic resources,
but stipulates that such access is dependent upon "mutually agreed
terms." 55 While REDD+ does not access forests for their genetic resources,
the CBD still presents a rudimentary analog for the quidpro quo MMRVfor-REDD+ scheme being contemplated.
Sovereignty has a price: The share of the enormous amounts of money
pledged for Kyoto follow-up aid (some of which goes to REDD+), not to
mention the funds available from Norway, the voluntary market,
California's REDD+ program, etc. Tyler Welti writes of "market
sovereignty": Sovereignty is less an indivisible, inalienable entitlement, and
more accurately a commodity that a nation can divide into quanta and put
up portions for bid; provided a nation doesn't give up too many quanta of
sovereignty, international efficiency and cooperation can improve through
sovereignty commodity trading.356 As REDD+ stakeholders quantify the
various parameters, and make them MMRV-able, they facilitate sovereignty
commodity trading. REDD+ funding might set a price high enough to
entice Southern nations to give up more of their PSNR legal rights and trade
353. See French, supra note 12, at 397 (arguing that issues of common concern to the
international community require that community to provide assistance regarding those issues).
354. See Jutta Brunnie, Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern, supra note
228, at 563, 565 ( "Proposals to extend the reach of the common heritage concept beyond common areas
and their resources have also stalled.").
355. French, supranote 12, at 396.
356. Welti, supranote 199, at 340, 366.
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away just a bit of their governance rights, thereby allowing international
observers to police their forests from satellite and up close. The increasing
and disparate quantified values of trees may entice Northern entities to open
up their GHG emissions and financial accounting books. MMRV is part of
this price.
On one hand, this may be seen as a form of bribery, revealing the
fiction of "sovereign equality" of nations. Everyone may get one vote at the
UN General Assembly, but some nations are more equal than others. The
United Kingdom can determine its own political institutions more
definitively than can any of its former colonies; the United States can
pursue its sovereign goals-territorial integrity, determination of political
institutions, domestic resource use-more robustly than Tuvalu can.
But it's not simply that the South is putting its forests up for sale to the
highest bidder, caving under Northern pressure or domestic need. It's not so
much market sovereignty as sovereignty by contract. Both sides of the
North/South axis are bargaining for what they want, as sovereign nations
are wont to do. They are in part driven by the terms of international lawboth treaty obligations and the exigencies of principle that exert their force,
whether the principles do or don't amount to custom.
Demands for MMRV are interconnected, and if fulfilled as part of a
post-Kyoto deal, bring the ideal of sovereign equality closer to reality. One
set of parties fulfills sovereign responsibilities under international law to
pay for the pollution they created while reducing the pollution so as not to
further impinge on other parties' sovereignty. In so doing, they acquire
access to forests they covet for multiple reasons. The other parties acquire
more sovereignty (less GHGs to impair their territory; more funds to be
able to manage their domestic and international affairs) by giving up some
sovereignty. MMRV for REDD+ is a sovereignty battle fought to a draw.
D.A. French writes that we must not treat sovereignty
as a static, immovable fact, but rather as a flexible tool
through which states can more effectively act in an
increasingly interdependent global society. Sovereignty is
not the antithesis to environmental protection, far from it. It
is through a nation state being sovereign - namely being in
a position to regulate internal matters and negotiate at an
external level - that it can most appropriately seek to
conserve both its own and the global environment.s?

357. French, supra note 12, at 399.
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Northern nations, by and large, have created the climate change crisis;
Southern nations, by and large, will pay the price. Southern nations have a
magnificent resource-their forests-that Northerners prize, historically as
a source of timber products, and now, increasingly, as a harbor for
biodiversity, a haven for indigenous people, and a repository for the North's
industrial carbon excess. Environmental protection is, one hopes, better
achieved through a program of MMRV for REDD+ that reconceives the
boundaries of sovereignty to strengthen sovereignty.
More fundamentally, the laws of ecology that cannot be
countermanded by human decrees present an empirical force to which
international law must yield. To re-envision and reconstruct "sovereignty"
is to acknowledge the challenge of the biophysical environment to
international law: Ecological processes know no natural boundaries, and
failing to acknowledge this by neglecting to adapt our legal regimes to the
exigencies of the physical world is a paragon of human hubris.
To negotiate reciprocal MMRV demands is both to relinquish and to
gain some degree of sovereignty over prized resources; to protect the rights
and sustain the resources of citizens, for whom national leaders serve as
trustees and whose rights "sovereignty" exists to protect; to assert
sovereignty in controlling one's relations with other nations by trading
valuable resources quid pro quo; and to nudge sovereignty towards
reciprocal cooperation for shared, essential goals. In making reciprocal
MMRV demands for a REDD+ program, all actors are negotiating the
boundaries of sovereignty for a mistrustful, imperiled, increasingly
interconnected world.
CONCLUSION

Global climate change may be the greatest threat we face, but it leads
the parade of other daunting challenges humans and nonhumans face in the
twenty-first century. We need a robust, multilateral, transparent
international legal system to help see us through.
Law constrains and enables society. Law dissuades us from bending to
our basest desires, but also allows us to fulfill the best ends of our lives,
providing we do not harm others in the process. Internationallaw has
largely sought to constrain and enable what nations may and may not do
vis-A-vis other nations; more recently, international law has extended its
reach to regulate, in some contexts, how national leaders may treat their
own citizens and the citizens of other nations. In the international law
ecosystem, legal institutions must adapt as the world evolves, or these
institutions must go extinct. In the emerging MMRV for REDD+ regime I
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discuss here, global climate change is shaping how we conceive of and
structure our legal ecosystems. If we fail to adapt our laws to a changing
climate, we may abet unimaginable suffering.
Professor Daniel Bodansky discusses three models of international law
as applied to the Durban Platform specifically, and climate change
mitigation and adaptation generally. In the contractualmodel, a nation will
negotiate and obey agreements as long as it benefits and the treaty
"contract" ensures that all sides comply. 35 8 Bodansky avers that this fails in
current climate change treaty negotiations because many of the partiesespecially the US and China-are unwilling to enter into a contract where
they perceive they would lose more than they would gain. Similarly, the
prescriptive model-where explicit rules or customary norms dictate the
"correct" rules for what parties must and should do-fails because not
everyone agrees what the correct rules are, and because no means of
compliance exists to make the parties do what they ought to do.359 This
leaves us with the facilitative model, where international law catalyzes what
nations, subnational governments, communities, and private businesses and
individuals are already inclined to do. Thus the "Copenhagen Accord and
Cancun Agreements reflect a facilitative model by seeking to encourage
national pledges, establishing reporting and assessment mechanisms to
promote transparency, and creating the Green Climate Fund to assist
developing countries with mitigation and adaptation." 6 o
Certainly the MMRV for REDD+ system I portray here reflects a
facilitative model of international law: Memorialized in individual
contracts, in domestic legal systems, in World Bank and other donor
standards and codes for REDD+, this system facilitates and promotes
participation and compliance in a global (or simply two-party) REDD+
agreement. But surely international law can do more than this.
The emerging MMRV for REDD+ regime blends all three of these
models, ultimately prescribing (in domestic legislation, private standards,
and multiparty contracts) a set of rules that entities comply with because
they are all left better off, and facilitating compliance with these rules
through the system of mutually beneficial MMRV. MMRV for REDD+
shows how a contractual model of international law can work. Forests
acquire new value, because the prescriptive nature of the Kyoto Protocol
and domestic law that operationalizes the treaty (or otherwise imposes
GHG emission reductions) is creating a market for inexpensive offsets;
even where REDD+ offsets are not formally permitted, various stakeholders
358. Bodansky, supra note 183, at 7.
359. Id. at 10.
360. Id. at I1.
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recognize the value in preserving the carbon absorptive capacity of forests.
Thus, many parties make "Pareto gains"-not just social justice and human
rights advocates, or biodiversity proponents, or local citizens concerned
about protecting their ecological sources of livelihood, but also Northern
domestic leaders worried about cumbersome environmental laws and the
businesses and citizens they burden.36' And the MMRV for REDD+ regime
follows a prescribed model of international law. The prescriptions are
memorialized in individual contracts and codes of standards and,
eventually, in binding domestic law and international agreements. They also
carry a normative weight that combines seemingly disparate paradigms, as
Northern nations' (and, perhaps, corporations') "charitable" contributions
are nonetheless founded on an underlying notion of Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities: Having created the problem of global
climate change, they are the primary funders of efforts to compensate the
primary victims of current and incipient environmental change, albeit with
MMRV strings they attach to ensure a safe return on investment.
Although it springs from mistrust, the reciprocal, contractual
sovereignty model posed by MMRV for REDD+ brings parties together
through mutually beneficial give-and-take for an increasingly
interconnected future. A suitable MMRV regime-where all stakeholders
ensure that their interests and resources are appropriately valued-brings us
closer to a world where sovereign equality of nations is reality, and thus
brings us closer to a world of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
where all parties' interests are satisfied. Even if climate change turns out to
be the Y2K of global environmental disasters, the goals of REDD+
(preserving biodiversity, improving ecosystem services, alleviating poverty,
redistributing wealth from North to South), if realized, still contribute to a
world of deep equity. That is to say, in this author's value hierarchy, these
are all good outcomes. The model of proposed MMRV, if implemented, is a
similar good in itself, providing a model of reciprocal, non-hierarchical
cooperation to solve pressing problems and simultaneously ensure that
cooperation works.
Southern nations' forests are the planet's lungs, its repository of
resplendent biodiversity, and a source of resilience for local communities.
They are also, increasingly, cherished carbon storage repositories for the
North's industrial excesses. Southern nations will put their forests under
contract, allow them to be surveyed and quantified as carbon storage
devices, and accede to MMRV strings attached, if Northern nations pay and
pledge to reduce their emissions further-with MMRV attached to those
361.
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pledges as well. REDD+ for MMRV comprises a new conception of
reciprocal, contractual sovereignty: Bargaining nations (and sub- and
supranational parties) are devising a model for how parties can overcome
mistrust to move forward towards reciprocal, dialectic goals that
simultaneously promote the health and potential of humans, communities,
and ecosystems.
All of the proposed MMRV regimes, if implemented for REDD+,
could contribute to a world of deep equity. Ensuring that developed and
developing nations reduce emissions as they promise blunts the impact of
climate change on the poor and non-human through mitigation. Ensuring
that developed nations pay what they pledge does the same through
facilitating adaptation. Ensuring that benefits reach the intended audiences
in the developing world contributes to individual, community, and
ecological health and potential. Monitoring that developing nations reduce
deforestation as they say does the same. And crosscutting MMRV that
tracks social and biodiversity benefits promotes maximum benefits to
individual, community, and ecosystem health and potential from REDD+
funding.
An evolved sovereignty could emerge from successful MMRV regimes
that fosters greater cooperation, trust, technological developments, and legal
changes to tackle other pressing problems.

